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Note 
Researchers at the UCLA Institute of Transportation Studies conducted this research 
concerning possible changes to the Transportation Development Act (TDA) under the 
auspices of the California Transit Association and at the request of the California State 
Legislature. The findings and recommendations expressed in this report are those of 
the authors and not those of the California Transit Association or the California State 
Legislature. 
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Executive Summary 
This report examines the performance measures requirements in California’s 
Transportation Development Act (TDA) of 1971. The TDA is an important source of 
funding for the state’s public transit agencies, representing approximately 18 percent of 
their total (2018) revenue between the TDA’s two funds (LTF and STA). The TDA 
originated as an effort to modernize and expand public transit in California with 
dedicated revenue sources while also holding individual transit agencies accountable 
for their public expenditures. Accordingly, specific performance measures and 
thresholds were established for all agencies in the state. The most notable of these was 
the farebox recovery rate, which was established in 1978. However, the Legislature has 
periodically added exemptions to the TDA’s requirements, departing from the uniform 
performance-threshold approach first adopted.  
 
Since the TDA’s passage in 1971, the transit operating environment in California has 
changed, in some cases dramatically. The state has nearly doubled in population (20.4 
million in 1971 to 39.8 million in 2019), traffic has worsened considerably, climate 
change is now a central public policy focus, and many places around the state are 
investing heavily in making public transit a viable alternative to driving. Many of the 
state’s transit operators serve expanding, auto-oriented environments, while others 
must cope with high and rising costs in large cities. Recently, however, ridership has 
been slipping, undermining performance. Vicissitudes in federal funding have further 
compounded operators’ management challenges.  
 
Our research examined the TDA’s performance requirements and their effects on the 
state’s transit operators. We also considered alternative approaches to both transit 
finance and performance requirements, by studying transit funding programs in 13 
other states that invest significant amounts of funding in transit. In brief, we find that 
the TDA’s use of performance measurements to allocate funding is unusual. The states 
we studied do not for the most part make funding contingent on performance, thereby 
avoiding the unproductive and difficult-to-implement “death penalty” (Taylor, 1995) of 
withholding subsidies for a much-needed public service. In several of the cases 
analyzed, by contrast, states guarantee specific levels or amounts of funding for transit 
service.  
 
To examine how the TDA’s performance measures are working, we conducted a 
survey of California transit professionals at agencies and at Regional Transportation 
Planning Agencies (RTPAs). To operators, the farebox recovery rate is a prominent 
requirement in the TDA and a hurdle to clear to receive funding. While the farebox 
recovery rate serves as a useful general indicator of cost-effectiveness and has its 
merits, California’s exclusive use of this measure appears to have influenced agency 
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management decisions in ways that state officials might have intended in the 1970s, 
but that appear increasingly out of alignment with many of California’s goals for public 
transit today. While cost-effective transit is surely as desirable a goal now as then, 
increasing ridership and serving the needs of the mobility disadvantaged are important 
goals as well, and all can conflict with an exclusive focus on cost-effectiveness. Our 
survey results suggest that the TDA’s reliance on a single cost-effective performance 
measure has, in fact, discouraged efforts to increase ridership and/or improve service 
to the mobility disadvantaged.  
 
That California’s aspirations for transit have evolved over the years is reflected in the 
frequent loopholes and exemptions the Legislature has added to the TDA to give 
struggling operators more latitude to receive funding in order to meet multiple goals 
and objectives while staying in compliance with a single cost-effectiveness goal. The 
extent and frequency with which these exemptions have occurred suggests that the 
larger aims for public transit, and indeed the goals for the TDA program itself, have 
evolved, and need to be re-thought holistically, rather than incrementally. 
 
Accordingly we offer six recommendations concerning transit performance 
assessment vis-a-vis the TDA: 
 
1) Replace the farebox recovery rate threshold requirement with annual reporting 
on a more comprehensive set of performance measures: Multiple performance 
measures in place of the current one-size-fits-all farebox recovery rate will 
provide public officials with more comprehensive assessments of transit 
performance and will align better with the state’s multiple goals for transit. 
 
2) Adopt peer group comparisons: We recommend evaluating the performance 
measures described in 1) both over time and in comparison with other, similar 
agencies. Grouping agencies into “peer groups” for comparison means that 
agency-specific problems and virtues will be easier to identify, since 
performance gaps will be clearer and more relevant. 
  
3) Use standard deviation analysis to identify agency outliers: Using “threshold” 
standards to measure compliance is problematic: they encourage managers to 
“manage to the measure” and provide little incentive to improve performance 
beyond the standard. We recommend determining compliance using 
Pennsylvania’s method: agencies are in compliance if their performance metrics 
are within one standard deviation of their peer group average. This method 
identifies compliance issues without distorting management incentives. 
 
4) Redeploy the current performance audit requirement: We recommend audits 
be used for identifying needs for technical assistance in addition to monitoring 
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performance. We also recommend shifting from a rigid triennial schedule to 
one that varies based on the findings of previous audits so that audit resources 
can be directed to agencies that most need them. 
 
5) Provide technical assistance through RTPAs or a state Transit Excellence Center 
(TEC): To help transit agency managers meet their agency’s compliance 
standards and/or performance goals (where audits have identified the need), 
we recommend making RTPAs a technical resource for consulting-type reviews 
and recommendations. Alternatively, the establishment of a state Transit 
Expertise Center could centralize the already available resources of the state’s 
transportation institutes. 
 
6) Establish a framework and authority for remedial action: When audits and 
technical assistance are not sufficient to bring an agency into compliance, a 
framework for action, including even agency restructuring, will help to improve 
the state’s average transit performance. 
 
Table ES.1 outlines aspects of the current TDA and the changes to them suggested in 
our recommendations. 
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Table ES.1  Current TDA and recommended changes  
 CURRENT TDA RECOMMENDED CHANGES  
Performance 
measures 
Farebox recovery rate (LTF and STA), 
CPI cost escalation limit (STA only) 
Cost-efficiency, service-
effectiveness, and cost-
effectiveness measures: 
● Unlinked passenger trips per 
vehicle revenue hour 
● Operating expenses per 
vehicle revenue hour  
● Operating revenue per 
vehicle revenue hour 
● Operating costs per 
unlinked passenger trip  
● Unlinked passenger trips per 
capita  
● Vehicle revenue hours per 
capita  
Audits: frequency 
and purpose 
Annual: compliance-based 
Triennial: compliance-based 
Annual: cost-efficiency standard 
compliance, needs assessment for 
technical assistance 
Quadrennial: Performance goal setting 
and progress-tracking 
Basis of agency 
comparison 
Urban, non-urban (with special 
conditions for low-population counties, 
older agencies, etc.) 
Peer groups based on agency operating 
characteristics  
Basis of agency 
compliance 
Threshold metric (met or not met) Performance within one standard 
deviation of peer group average or 
better 
Consequence of 
compliance failure 
Funding withheld Technical assistance required for initial 
failure; ongoing failure could prompt 
RTPA action, potential agency 
restructuring in the long-term absence 
of progress 
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Introduction 
Researchers at the UCLA Institute of Transportation Studies prepared this report at the 
request of the California State Legislature under the auspices of the California Transit 
Association’s Transportation Development Act Reform Task Force. The purpose of this 
report and the research it summarizes is to describe: a) the current status of the 
Transportation Development Act, and how it has evolved from its original drafting, b) 
how agency professionals perceive the effects of its funding-determinative 
requirements, especially the farebox recovery rate and the use of the consumer price 
index (CPI) as an upper limit on the escalation of operating costs, and c) how the TDA’s 
structure, which ties funding allocations to performance assessment, compares with 
other states’ policies and funding procedures. 
 
In Section 1, our report describes the “TDA Today”, its current revenue amounts, funds 
appropriation, and funding eligibility requirements. We then discuss, in Section 2, the 
genesis and evolution of the TDA’s performance and audit requirements. A discussion 
of performance measures follows in Section 3 where, based on findings from previous 
academic research, we outline what a performance measure does, suggest criteria for 
choosing individual measures, and discuss the influence of performance measures on 
managerial decision-making. This section also provides a catalog of performance 
measure types. In Section 4, we look at how the TDA’s current performance measures 
are working through the lens of the criteria discussed in Section 3. 
 
In Section 5 of this report we discuss transit professionals’ perceptions of performance 
measures, and in Section 6 we describe the findings from a study of 13 other states’ 
performance measures used (or not used) in transit funding allocation. We also discuss 
performance audits in Section 7, looking at both how transit professionals perceive 
their burden and how other states conduct audits. 
 
Finally, in Section 8, we make recommendations concerning possible modifications to 
the TDA’s funding eligibility requirements and audit process. We conclude that 
updating the TDA to incorporate best practices from other states and to reflect 
California’s modern transit operating environment would advance the state’s ability to 
improve transit service and ridership. 
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1. What the TDA looks like today 
 
California’s Transportation Development Act (TDA) of 1971 provides funding for public 
transit and non-transit purposes that comply with Regional Transportation Plans 
through two sources: the Local Transportation Fund (LTF), which is funded from a ¼-
cent state general sales tax that was established in 1972, and the State Transit 
Assistance (STA) fund that draws revenue from state sales taxes on diesel fuel, 
established in 1980. The LTF is the third largest state source of total transit operator 
revenue, accounting for $1.3 billion in 2018 or 14.5% of total revenue from all sources. 
STA funds are a smaller source of funds for transit operators than the LTF, amounting 
to $274 million in 2018 or approximately 3% of all revenues (California State 
Controller’s Office, n.d.). Between 2011 and 2017, LTF revenues increased 55% while 
STA funds declined 38%. The Road Repair and Accountability Act of 2017 (SB 1), 
however, boosted STA funding by an additional $105 million per year.  
 
Table 1.1 summarizes the differences in LTF and STA funds, which are discussed in 
detail below. 
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 Table 1.1  Comparison of LTF and STA funds 
 LOCAL TRANSPORTATION 
FUND (LTF) 
STATE TRANSIT 
ASSISTANCE (STA) 
Established 1972 1980 
Source State general sales tax (¼ 
cent) 
State taxes on diesel fuel 
Revenue 
generated  
(FY 2018) 
$1.30 billion  $274.2 million 
Disbursement State Board of Equalization 
collects sales taxes, returns 
apportioned revenues to 
each county 
Controller allocates revenue 
by statutory formula: 50% by 
area population1, 50% by 
transit operator revenues 
from previous year 
Allowed uses Pedestrian and bicycle 
facilities, community transit, 
public transportation, bus 
and rail projects, 
transportation planning and 
programming activities 
Transportation planning and 
mass transportation only 
Claimant 
eligibility 
requirements  
(See text for 
details, 
exceptions, 
and other 
conditions) 
 
“Farebox ratio” of 20% in urbanized and 10% in non-urbanized 
areas; 15% in low-population counties with urbanized areas. 
 Large counties must allocate 
apportioned LTF funds 
before receiving STA funds. 
 
CPI-adjusted operating cost 
per vehicle revenue hour in 
the just-completed year 
must not exceed the 
previous year’s level or the 
average of preceding three 
years’ level. 
 
 
1 Areas within the county. “An area can be a transit district, city, county, etc. For a county without a 
transit district, apportionments are made for the incorporated area of each city and for the county’s 
unincorporated area. Where there is a transit district, separate apportionments are made to areas within 
and outside the district.” Caltrans Division of Rail and Mass Transportation. (2018). Transportation 
Development Act (TDA) Statutes and California Code of Regulations (p. 5). Retrieved from 
http://www.dot.ca.gov/drmt/docs/tda/TDA_07-2018.pdf 
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LTF fund apportionment and use 
LTF quarter-cent general sales tax revenue is collected by the State Board of 
Equalization, which returns apportioned revenues to each county’s LTF. Counties may 
use LTF funds for various transportation programs including “planning and program 
activities, pedestrian and bicycle facilities, community transit services, public 
transportation, and bus and rail projects” (Caltrans, 2018, p. 2). Counties with fewer 
than 500,000 people in the 1970 Census may use LTF funds for local streets and roads 
construction and maintenance if they can demonstrate that all “reasonable” public 
transit needs have been met. 
 
STA funds appropriation and use  
STA funds from the state sales tax on diesel fuel are appropriated to the Controller’s 
Office by the state legislature. The Controller’s Office allocates revenue to planning and 
other agencies by a statutory formula: 50% by population and 50% by agency 
operating revenues from the previous fiscal year. STA funds may only be used for 
transportation planning and mass transportation. In addition, counties with populations 
over 500,000 (in the 1970 Census) may not receive STA funds until all of its LTF 
apportionment is allocated (Caltrans, 2018, p. 6).  
TDA funding eligibility and “farebox ratio” requirements 
To qualify for both LTF and STA funding under the TDA, transit operators must show 
that their fare-revenue-to-operating-cost (“farebox ratio”) is the greater of: i) the ratio 
that operator had in 1978/1979, or ii) 20% if the agency is in an urbanized area, or 10% if 
it is outside of an urbanized area. Agencies in urbanized areas that had ratios greater 
than 20%  (or 10% in non-urbanized areas) in the 1978/1979 fiscal year must maintain 
that ratio with fare revenues and/or local government subsidies. Transportation 
planning agencies or commissions in urbanized areas within counties with populations 
of 500,000 or less may have farebox ratios of 15%.. No required farebox ratio applies 
to services exclusively for elderly and disabled persons. Ratio requirements also do not 
apply if two separate labor disputes of 15 days or longer or one week of stoppages 
unrelated to labor disputes occurred in the reported year. Operating cost is defined as 
all costs incurred in operating transit service except depreciation and amortization, 
minus the cost exclusions and exemptions specified by statutes and codes of 
regulations, which are described below.   
 
Exclusions and exemptions to the ratio requirement 
Among the expense exclusions operators report are those incurred in providing 
charter service, leasing vehicles, and providing commuter rail services.   
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The allowable expense exemptions are (1) the cost of providing ridesharing (carpooling 
and vanpooling) services,2 (2) the additional costs (exceeding the CPI-adjusted prior 
year costs) of providing “comparable, complementary,” ADA-compliant paratransit 
service, and (3) the cost of new routes or extensions of public transit service “until two 
years after the end of the fiscal year in which the extension of services was put into 
operation” (Caltrans, 2018, p. 61).   
 
TDA fund claimants may also adjust the calculation of operating costs to account for 
cost increases beyond the change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for fuel, 
alternative fuel programs, power, insurance premiums and liability payments, and 
state or federal mandates.  
 
Consequences of failure to meet the ratio requirement 
If TDA funding recipients fail to meet ratio requirements in a fiscal year, their TDA 
funding is reduced by the amount of the shortfall, i.e., the difference between the ratio-
required amount and actual revenues. An exemption exists for first-time shortfalls. To 
avoid failing the ratio requirement, agency and commission managers have the option 
of raising local support funding to reach the required ratio amount. Some TDA 
claimants may be able to apply for LTF funds under Article 8 “Other Claims for Funds.” 
 
Additional eligibility requirements for STA Funds 
Use of STA funds requires transit operators to meet additional eligibility criteria: their 
total operating cost per revenue vehicle hour must be equal to or lower than the 
previous year’s level, allowing for changes in the locality’s CPI. Alternatively, operators 
may compare the average operating cost per vehicle hour and average change in CPI 
in the latest three years (e.g., 2015-2017) with those of the three years preceding the 
latest year (e.g., 2014-2016) and show that the latest three years do not reflect an 
increase in operating cost.  Operators failing to meet either criterion receive the 
allocated funds but a proportion of the allocation equal in amount to the shortfall must 
be used for capital purposes only (Caltrans, 2018, p. 90).  
 
 
2 Per California Public Utilities Code § 99211.5, “Ridesharing services means a comprehensive 
organizational effort which is designed to reduce the number of vehicles on the highways during peak 
travel periods within a defined area by encouraging the planning and marketing of high-occupancy 
vehicle facilities, increases in the number of passengers per vehicle in vehicles used for ridesharing, 
alternative work schedules, and other transportation demand management strategies among employers 
and commuters.” 
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Trends in operating cost exemptions 
As shown in Figure 1.1 below, between 2003 and 2017, operator exclusions and 
exemptions (denoted by the orange bars) reached a peak of $172.6 million in 2006 
(2.9% of that year’s total expenditures), but since 2011, the amount of exclusions and 
exemptions has been relatively stable, varying between $77.0 million (2012) and $94 
million (2017), even as the number of reporting agencies (illustrated by the blue line) 
has risen slightly.   
15 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1  Exclusions and exemptions, Amount and Number of Reporting 
Agencies, over time (2003-2017) 
Data source: California State Controller’s Office Database (California State Controller’s 
Office, n.d.) 
 
 
As shown in Figure 1.2, paratransit services constitute the largest category of exclusions 
and exemptions in the years 2011-2017; insurance premiums and claims are the second 
largest category. Services extension and ridesharing exemptions have generally 
decreased and are a small share of the annual totals (5% in 2017).  
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Figure 1.2  Exclusions and exemptions by category (2011-2017) 
Data source: California State Controller’s Office Database (California State Controller’s 
Office, n.d.) 
 
 
Summary 
Through its two funds (LTF and STA), the TDA provides approximately 18% of all state 
transit revenue (as of 2018). To receive state funding, local transit operators must meet 
eligibility criteria that include collecting sufficient farebox revenue (or supplementing it 
with local support) to reach a specified share of operating expenses. The TDA specifies 
a “farebox ratio” for urbanized areas (20%), non-urbanized areas (10%), and low-
population counties with urbanized areas (15%), with some exceptions. Penalties for 
failing to meet the farebox ratio include a withholding of subsidy in the amount of the 
shortfall. Operators can claim exemptions and exclusions to the costs included in the 
farebox ratio requirement, and a common exemption is for paratransit costs.  
 
We discuss the full history of the TDA and how it came to take on its current form in 
the next section (Section 2: How the TDA became what it is today.) 
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2. How the TDA became what it is today 
The lead-up to TDA 
Public transit during the middle of the twentieth century was in transition from private 
to public ownership. Growing automobile use and suburbanization were peaking and 
taking their toll on transit ridership. Struggling private transit operators were 
everywhere experiencing bankruptcies, abandonments, or public takeovers. By the 
1960s, most big-city transit properties had become public operations, while smaller 
town and rural operators mostly were still in private hands. Thus, the majority of transit 
operators in the nation were still privately owned, while most passengers were carried 
on larger systems that had become public agencies. Transit operators everywhere – 
public and private –  were scrambling to find new resources.  Their passenger bases 
were moving away from their service areas and increasingly commuting by auto. In 
addition, they had inherited antiquated facilities, huge maintenance backlogs, and 
expensive labor agreements with frequently unionized workforces. Led by mayors and 
members of Congress from large metropolitan areas, the federal government started 
subsidizing transit in 1961 and enacted the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 
creating the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) – now the Federal 
Transit Administration (FTA) – which provided funding for transit capital 
improvements, including the public acquisition of formerly private transit operators.   
 
The infusion of federal support was helpful but fell far short of the funding needed to 
modernize transit. For the first 13 years of the rapidly expanding UMTA program, 
however, federal funds could only be used for the purchase of rolling stock and capital 
equipment; before 1974, the federal government clearly saw transit operating subsidies 
as the responsibility of states and localities. Furthermore, matching funds from state 
and local sources were required to obtain some of the federal funds so pressure 
mounted for increased state participation in transit funding. Transit operators were left 
without the financial resources to operate an expanding fleet of new, federally 
financed transit vehicles. In California, this need for operating funds eventually led to 
passage of the Transportation Development Act (TDA) (Taylor, 1991). 
 
For decades, the largest source of transportation revenue in California was motor fuel 
taxes, which were widely regarded through the 1970s as user fees. Many supported 
and others opposed the “diversion” of motor fuel tax revenues from highways to 
public transit. Supporters argued that such revenues should apply to transportation 
expenditures broadly, while opponents countered that revenues collected from 
highway users should go to highway expenditures. The need for transit subsidies and 
the widespread opposition to the use of gasoline taxes for anything other than roads 
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and highways resulted in a rather complex outcome that attempted to find 
compromise among competing interests (Brown, 1999). 
 
Support for public transit was controversial and debates were politically charged.  
Despite the clear need for the modernization of core services in densely populated 
areas, the availability of public funding from general funds led taxpayers in growing 
suburban areas that were poorly served by transit to demand more service.  They 
were contributing most of the tax revenue available to transit and wanted to see a 
return on their investment.    
 
Passage of TDA 
With farebox revenue and federal funding falling far short of what was needed to 
operate, modernize and expand public transit in California and after long and 
acrimonious debates, the legislature passed and the governor signed the 
Transportation Development Act (TDA) in 1971 (Stats. 1971, c. 1400). The TDA marked 
the beginning of measures that made some road user charges available to public 
transportation.   
 
The TDA extended the sales tax to gasoline to broaden the revenue base and increase 
revenue collection. Gasoline had previously been exempt from general sales taxes 
because it was subject to per gallon excise taxes which were considered to be user 
fees that differ in principle from general taxes. The Act also authorized counties to 
increase local sales taxes by 0.25 percent to finance local transit operations. To keep 
the overall sales tax rate constant, the TDA also lowered the state sales tax on all 
purchases by the same 0.25 percent (from 4 percent to 3.75 percent).  A portion of 
these funds, known as the “spillover,” was reserved to support local bus and transit 
operations and interregional mass transportation. The amount of spillover revenues in 
any given year depended on the price of gasoline and fuel consumption compared to 
other goods. In technical terms, the spillover consisted of the amount by which 
revenues from the 3.75 percent tax on gasoline exceeded the revenue that would have 
been collected from the eliminated 0.25 percent sales taxes on all other goods. 
 
Under the TDA, taxpayers were protected from a general tax increase to support 
transit by treating most of the yield from sales taxes on gasoline purchases as general 
revenue. On the other hand, any excess sales taxes collected from gasoline purchases 
over the amount needed to make the general fund whole could be regarded as user 
fees designed to mitigate the externalities from automobile use. While sales tax 
revenues generally better keep pace with inflation than excise taxes, sales tax 
revenues decrease when prices or sales volumes fall. Moreover, sales taxes on 
gasoline tend to be volatile since the price of fuel fluctuates more than prices in 
general. Finally, the peculiar spillover formula meant that the amounts were not 
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guaranteed; when gas prices were high, substantial additional tax revenues would 
become available to support mass transportation, while little or no monies would be 
generated in other years.  
 
When available, spillover funds were deposited into a special account, now known as 
the Public Transportation Account (PTA) in the state treasury. However, since the uses 
of spillover sales tax revenues were not constitutionally restricted like fuel excise 
taxes, the legislature was free to use them for other purposes. In addition to TDA 
funding for transit, in 1973 the legislature proposed a constitutional amendment (Stats. 
1973, res. c. 145 (S.C.A. 15)) that expanded the permitted use of motor fuel excise taxes 
from authorized highway purposes to building and maintaining exclusive mass 
transportation guideways and some forms of transit maintenance. Opponents viewed 
this as a diversion of existing highway revenues to non-highway purposes. Voters, 
however, approved the measure (Proposition 5) in the June 1974 state primary election. 
Outside of guideway projects, the level of financial support for transit operations still 
depended on the size of spillover from year to year, which in turn was governed by the 
price and amount of gasoline sales compared to sales of all other goods. Through the 
mid-1980s, the spill-over generated between $2 million and $159 million per year, 
making it a highly variable and unpredictable source of funding. The volatility in 
revenue from the general sales tax spillover led recipients to advocate for more stable 
and predictable transit funding and this led to the state in 1980 committing revenues 
from diesel fuel sales taxes to the support of public transit by establishing the State 
Transit Assistance fund (Garrett, Brown, & Wachs, 2016).   
 
Three Democrats (Mills, Alquist and Deddah) wrote the TDA legislation but many 
compromises were necessary to gain support from rural and suburban legislators and 
to have it signed by Republican Governor Ronald Reagan, who made it clear that he 
opposed new taxes. The key political compromises necessary to enact the TDA are 
summarized in this 1991 report (Taylor, 1991): 
 
When first approached with the TDA, Governor Reagan wanted the 
proposal put before the voters. Knowing that it was unlikely that 
voters statewide would support a measure so clearly intended for 
central city transit users, Legislators Mills, Alquist, and Deddeh sought 
to modify the transit sales tax proposal both to satisfy the governor 
and avoid a plebiscite. The first step was to technically designate the 
1/4 cent of the sales tax for the TDA as a "local tax" instead of a state 
tax. At the time, California had a uniform 5 percent sales tax in all 58 
counties (4 percent state, and 1 percent local). When the sales tax 
was extended to gasoline by the TDA, the state-local split of sales tax 
was also changed to 3.75 percent state and 1.25 percent local. The 
additional 0.25 percent local tax, however, was not very local; 
expenditure of these funds was made subject to state statutes and 
administrative code of the TDA. In order to further assuage the 
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governor, each of California's 58 county boards of supervisors voted 
whether to extend the sales tax to gasoline and accept an additional 
0.25 percent of the sales tax for TDA expenditures. The vote, 
however, did not offer the county supervisors much of a choice. At 
the time, the California Franchise Tax Board required that the sales 
tax be uniform in all counties (this has since been changed to allow 
special county sales taxes for transportation); if a county did not 
agree to the uniform state sales tax (which was a nickel at the time), 
then that county forfeited all state-collected sales tax revenues. The 
county supervisors were thus given a choice whether to extend the 
sales tax to gasoline and accept an additional 0.25 percent local 
funds for the TDA, or forgo all local sales tax revenues. Given this 
choice, it is not surprising that the counties voted unanimously for the 
TDA and thus satisfied Governor Reagan's desire for a local vote. 
Rural and suburban counties, however, were not simply strong-
armed into supporting a transit funding program for the central cities. 
The TDA was fashioned to appeal to the interests of rural and 
suburban counties. The appeal to rural interests was straightforward; 
small counties would be permitted to use some of their TDA funds 
for road projects. Counties with 1970 populations below 500,000 
can use TDA funds for streets and roads if the presiding 
transportation planning agency determines that there are no "unmet 
transit needs that are reasonable to meet" (The unmet needs process 
was actually added to the TDA later as administrative code because 
many rural counties were not funding public transit and using all of 
their TDA funds for streets and roads.) Such determinations are 
nearly automatic in rural counties. 
 
More important than the rural streets and roads concession, 
however, are the strict return-to-source provisions in the Act. In 
order to make the TDA a local tax, the Act creates a Local 
Transportation Fund (LTF) for TDA funds generated in each county; 
because the LTF is a local fund, TDA funds generated in rural and 
suburban counties cannot be moved across county lines for use by 
transit operators in urban areas. 
 
The focus on transit system performance 
An analysis of national trends in transit finance in the early 1970s showed that a 
substantial share of the new funding had not led to better service or increased 
patronage. Instead, it had contributed to higher wages and improved fringe benefits for 
transit workers, and – reflecting the return to source provisions of TDA and similar 
laws elsewhere – to the expansion of service into low density markets where service 
was infrequent, lightly patronized, and expensive to operate.  Deficits were growing 
rather than decreasing as public support for transit expanded, and by the late 1960s 
there emerged a consensus that increased funding  needed to be coupled with 
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demanding standards to ensure that the support would enhance efficiency and 
prevent waste (Pickrell, 1985).    
 
Many interest groups were critical of the periodic increases in commitments of 
transportation-related tax revenues to public transit. These included advocates of 
lower taxes of all types, those who felt transit operators were inefficient, and those 
who insisted that motor vehicle taxes should be devoted exclusively to highway 
maintenance and capital improvements. Senator Mills was concerned that state 
support for transit operations should not become an entitlement and certainly should 
not become a substitute for local government contributions to the operations of their 
transit properties. This concern for what Senator Mills called “financial discipline” led to 
an early requirement that local governments match transit support from the state 
dollar for dollar. But, the most common source of the matching money was revenue 
derived from county property taxes and the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 caused 
many counties to seek relief from the matching requirement. While willing to amend 
the legislation to eliminate the local match, the state still sought ways to promote 
financial discipline. In its place, the state required minimum farebox recovery rates that 
differed between urban (20%) and rural areas (10%). It also required that newly-
created transit operators start with a minimum 20% ratio requirement.    
 
Responding to Senator Mills’ calls for financial discipline and transparency, the state 
also coupled the state’s post-Proposition 13 increased allocations to public transit with 
a commitment to monitor transit performance to ensure that the funds were spent to 
control transit operating cost increases, increase efficiency, and report as transparently 
as possible how the funds were being used. The seventies and eighties saw rapid 
growth in popular and scholarly literature addressing alternative ways to measure 
transit performance and this period also gave rise to periodic “performance audits” of 
transit properties.   Professor Gordon J. “Pete” Fielding, a prolific scholar and Director of 
the Institute of Transportation Studies at the time, was also a member of the California 
Transportation Commission. He played a major personal role advocating for applying 
performance measures to the process of distributing funds under the TDA.   
 
The burgeoning literature on the measurement of transit performance led to multiple 
measures of performance being proposed, tested, and debated. One group of 
measures were proposed to measure “cost-efficiency,” which concentrated on the 
amount of service offered per dollar of cost regardless of how many people rode the 
buses or trains. But experts differed as to whether those costs should be expressed per 
vehicle hour or per vehicle mile. Urban systems, for example, preferred to report costs 
per vehicle hour because a great deal of their service operates on congested street 
networks so they cover fewer miles per hour of service than suburban systems.  
Suburban operators preferred to measure cost per vehicle mile, since they operate at 
higher speeds and achieve more miles per service hour. And, because buses and trains 
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can differ greatly from one another in terms of capacity, some suggested that seat 
miles should be the basis of comparison; others argued that seat miles ignored the 
capacity to carry standing passengers (Fielding, Glauthier, & Lave, 1978).  
 
Another group of measures focused on actual rather than potential ridership. 
Performance measures based on the number of passengers served per unit of service 
provided came to be called “service-effectiveness” measures. Urban operators, who 
operate in densely-populated areas, are comfortable reporting passenger boardings 
per vehicle hour or per vehicle mile, while rural and suburban operators appear to be 
less productive if the same metric is applied to them because they serve market areas 
that are more sparsely populated (Dajani & Gilbert, 1978).  
 
It was easy to agree that performance should be measured, but nearly impossible to 
agree on the best way to do that since what is considered the best way of measuring 
performance clearly differs among transit operators. Each favors particular measures 
of performance that reflect their unique operating environments. The complexity that 
today exists in formulas for distributing resources reflects a sequence of adjustments 
to performance measurement attempting to satisfy these competing preferences.  
 
Performance audits  
When the TDA was amended in 1978 in the wake of Proposition 13, the one-to-one 
local match requirement (that local operators struggled to meet) was replaced by what 
was at the time frequently called a “stringent” performance audit requirement (Lamare, 
1981). Audits meant that the performance of each property could be tracked over time 
and that this would be a fairer measure of the effective use of TDA funds than ratios 
that compared properties to one another. Independent auditors had to be hired every 
three years to report on each agency’s performance in two phases. In Phase I, the 
auditors reviewed the past audit results and certified the agency’s current operating 
cost per passenger; operating cost per vehicle service hour; passengers per vehicle 
service hour; passengers per in-service vehicle mile; and vehicle service miles per 
employee. Phase II of the audit required that the auditor analyze and explain the 
reasons that agency performance had deteriorated, when it had, since the last audit 
with respect to any of the listed criteria. In most instances, the audits addressed such 
issues as an agency’s rates of employee absenteeism, staffing shortages, administrative 
costs in relation to direct vehicle operating costs, and financial claims on the agency 
due to negligence and crashes. The particular audit requirements have evolved and a 
guidebook explains current requirements, but it is clear that the performance audit 
evolved from a commitment to improve the efficiency of transit operations while 
recognizing that each transit provider faced unique conditions. Comparisons of each 
agency’s performance over time were seen as more meaningful than comparing 
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different agencies to one another (Fielding, 1992). Current performance audit 
requirements and guidelines are available in the Caltrans TDA Guidebook.3 
 
Summary 
Public transit transitioned from private to public ownership in the middle of the 
twentieth century. Federal support for public operators was at first limited to rolling 
stock and capital equipment; operating subsidies were the sole responsibility of states 
and localities. The need for operating funds to run the new, federally-funded transit 
vehicles led to California’s passage of the TDA in 1971. As an attempt to modernize 
transit, the TDA developed politically through the considerations of competing (and 
contentious) interests including highway users’ concerns about the “diversion” of fuel 
tax revenues from highways on the one hand and taxpayer demands for better service 
in growing suburban areas on the other. The necessary accommodations of, and 
compromises between, these competing interests resulted in complex funding 
allocation methods. 
 
Concerns about the efficiency of transit operators and their “financial discipline” led to 
the early requirement that localities match state support dollar for dollar. Following 
1978’s Prop 13, however, many counties sought relief from this requirement and the 
current farebox recovery rates of 20% (for urban areas) and 10% (for rural areas) were 
established in its place.  At the same time, strict audit requirements were established.   
 
Studies in the 1970s and 1980s into transit performance measurements developed 
much of the terminology and measures in use today, discussed in detail in the 
following section (Section 3). 
 
  
  
 
3 California Department of Transportation Division of Mass Transportation (2018). Transportation 
Development Act: Statutes and California Codes of Regulations. 
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3. What a performance measure does 
One of the basic purposes of transit performance measurements is to enable an 
evaluation of how well an agency is delivering its service (TCRP, 2003). Performance 
measures can be tracked internally by transit managers to help them understand and 
monitor their operations. Additionally, they can be publicly tracked and compared with 
other operators in the same area, and with peers around the state or country. Lastly, 
they can be used to allocate subsidies to transit agencies.  
 
There are many transit performance measures; one survey counted over 400 in use 
(TCRP, 2003). Some, like ridership, are simple. Others, like indexes, are complex.  
Although some measures are easier to calculate, comprehend, and compare than 
others, what makes a measure “good” is how well it is aligned with the goal of 
measurement. However, no single performance measure is comprehensive enough to 
reflect meaningfully the full scope of transit operations. 
 
Three categories of performance measure 
Although there are many types of performance measures, the most commonly used 
for system assessment fall into three general categories: cost-efficiency, service-
effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness. Cost-efficiency measures evaluate performance 
in terms of how much and with what inputs service is produced (inputs-to-outputs), 
service-effectiveness measures relate a quantity of outputs to the consumption of 
service (outputs-to-consumption), and cost-effectiveness measures essentially 
combine cost-efficiency and service-effectiveness, assessing at what cost service is 
consumed (inputs/outputs-to-consumption). 
 
Figure 3.1 below shows how these categories of performance measurements relate to 
one another and basic inputs and outputs.   
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Figure 3.1  Performance measurement concept model 
Source: Fielding, Babitsky, & Brenner, 1985 
Cost-efficiency measures 
Cost-efficiency metrics include: operating cost per vehicle revenue mile, operating 
cost per vehicle revenue hour, and cost per vehicle trip. Although they are excellent 
measures for assessing the cost of delivering service, i.e., how much output (service) is 
produced for a given input (cost), they do not capture where, how, or if the produced 
service is actually used. In other words, cost-efficiency measures indicate what it costs 
to produce transit service but tell us nothing about the actual use of that service.  
 
Service-effectiveness measures 
Service-effectiveness measures include passengers per vehicle mile and passengers 
per vehicle hour. These measures are useful for assessing the level of demand per 
given input or output; they are effectively the inverse of cost-efficiency measures as 
they provide information about the level of service used but no information about the 
cost of service. 
 
Cost-effectiveness measures 
Cost-effectiveness performance measures combine aspects of cost-efficiency and 
service-effectiveness; they gauge the input (cost) needed to produce a measure of 
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consumption. These measures are the most comprehensive type of measure, reflecting 
both the input of cost and the output of service consumed. Their strength is their 
weakness, however: because they combine inputs and outputs in a single measure, 
they can be opaque: it is difficult to know why agencies might be performing well or 
poorly.  Some commonly used cost-effectiveness measures include: the farebox 
recovery rate, operating cost per passenger trip, operating cost per passenger mile, 
and subsidy per passenger. 
 
Table 3.1 below lists some examples of performance measures belonging to each 
category, their imputed management goals, and the advantages and limitations of each 
performance measure. Note that the categories of performance measure share broad 
limitations — service-effectiveness measures, for example, do not track costs — while 
each performance measure has its own limitations as well.  
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Table 3.1  A sample of measures, imputed goals, advantages and limitations 
TYPE PM EXAMPLE IMPUTED GOAL(S) ADVANTAGES LIMITATIONS 
Cost- 
efficiency 
Operating cost 
per revenue hour 
 
 
 
 
Reduce costs* 
 
 
 
 
Useful in both 
financial and 
service planning 
Favors shorter trips 
and/or quicker routes; 
does not track use 
Operating cost 
per revenue mile 
Favors longer trips and/or 
quicker routes; does not 
track use 
Operating cost 
per vehicle trip 
Favors shorter trips or 
routes; does not track use 
Service- 
effectiveness 
Passengers per 
revenue- 
vehicle hour 
Increase ridership; 
reduce poorly 
patronized service  
Useful in service 
planning; 
emphasizes what 
matters to riders 
Does not track costs 
Passengers per 
revenue- 
vehicle mile 
Increase ridership; 
reduce low-
ridership route 
miles/ 
segments 
Useful in service 
planning 
Does not track costs; 
favors long-distance 
service over local, 
express operators over 
local operators 
Cost- 
effectiveness 
Farebox recovery 
rate 
Reduce costs; 
increase fares; 
increase ridership 
Commonly used; 
easy to calculate 
 
Difficult to deconstruct 
and interpret; same 
measured outputs can 
have very different 
causes 
Operating ratio 
(revenue divided 
by costs) 
Increase revenue; 
Decrease costs 
Easy to calculate; 
tracks subsidy 
needed 
Operating cost 
per passenger 
Reduce costs; 
Increase ridership 
Simple Ignores highly variable 
marginal costs of service 
Subsidy per 
passenger 
Reduce costs; 
increase fares; 
increase ridership 
Identifies subsidy 
utilization 
Based on cost per rider, 
which must be calculated 
separately 
Fare revenue per 
passenger 
Increase ridership 
or increase fares 
Clearly related to 
demand; reveals 
value of service to 
riders  
Disfavors low- and no-
fare programs for special 
groups 
Overall  
input/ 
output 
measures 
Ridership Increase ridership Fundamental Comparisons across 
agencies are not 
meaningful; transfers 
inflate number of riders 
*Marginal cost of adding service assumed to be too high to lower ratio in most cases. 
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Why performance measures matter 
Many transit operators have either no stated goals or goals that are too broad or 
indistinct to guide decision-making (Dajani & Gilbert, 1978; Sheth, Triantis, & 
Teodorovic, 2007; Taylor & Morris, 2015; Yoh, Taylor, & Gahbauer, 2016). In the 
absence of clearly articulated goals, agencies may simply gear their operations toward 
whatever performance measurements happen to be imposed on them, especially if 
the measures are tied to funding eligibility; in other words, “what you measure is what 
you get” (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). In such cases, performance measures are not simply 
indicators of performance, but active influences or even de facto goals that affect 
outcomes. This is not, of course, inherently problematic, but it does underscore the 
importance of matching the measures that transit managers are motivated to optimize 
with agency goals and objectives. 
 
Why using any single performance measure is problematic 
The influence of performance measurement on outcomes is amplified when a single 
performance measure is the basis of agency assessment, and greater still when funding 
decisions also rest on the assessment.   
As an example, operating cost per vehicle revenue mile is a reasonable cost-efficiency 
metric that agencies commonly use for measuring the cost of their output (and report 
to the FTA’s National Transit Database).  But if agencies’ performance were assessed 
solely on the basis of this metric, managers would have an incentive to provide service 
in less congested, outlying areas (simply to achieve a better result on the metric), 
regardless of utilization or passenger demand. Any one performance measure used on 
its own results in similarly distorted incentives. 
As Table 3.1 illustrates, no single measure is sufficiently comprehensive to reflect or 
meaningfully compare the performance of transit operations (though cost-
effectiveness measures are more comprehensive than others). Cost-effectiveness 
measures do not directly track and cost-efficiency measures ignore service 
consumption, whereas productivity measures do not consider costs. This perhaps 
explains why many states use multiple performance measures simultaneously (See 
Section 5: “What Other States Use for Performance Measurement”). 
 
What makes a “good” performance measure? 
A “good” performance measure is an effective one, which is to say that it not only 
gauges a controllable aspect of performance and/or it tracks the progress toward a 
goal but it is also easy to derive, use, understand, and communicate.  By these criteria, 
some performance measures are more effective than others.  We summarize in Table 
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3.2 below the criteria we suggest for considering the strength of performance 
measures to include in performance assessment.   
 
Table 3.2  Suggested criteria for performance measures 
IMPORTANCE CRITERION FOR PM WEAKEST  STRONGEST  
⭐⭐⭐⭐ Aligns with goals or “represents 
the objectives that motivated 
public intervention” (Fielding 
1992) 
(Any single PM)  (Multiple PMs) 
⭐⭐⭐ Can “translate objectives into 
quantitative measures” (Fielding 
1992) 
Qualitative measures Quantitative measures 
⭐⭐⭐ Uses data that are reasonably 
accessible or gathered without 
undue burden 
PMs based on manually 
collected data or surveys, 
e.g., percentage of route 
on roadways operating at 
LOS E or F. 
PMs that use data already 
collected 
⭐⭐⭐ Can be consistently evaluated 
(FDOT 2014; Fielding 1992) 
PMs based on manually 
collected data or surveys 
PMs based on 
automatically collected 
data or regular surveys 
⭐⭐⭐ Measures aspects of transit 
service that agency management 
can control (FDOT 2014) 
PMs based on population, 
land use  
PMs based on costs per 
vehicle hour 
⭐⭐ Is easy to calculate Indexes Ratios 
⭐⭐ Motivates managers to improve 
performance over a standard 
(Taylor 1995; Fielding 1992) 
Thresholds Standard-deviations from 
mean 
⭐⭐ Is used in, or can be calculated 
with, data collected for NTD or 
other federal need 
Non-NTD based PMs, 
e.g., linked trips 
NTD-based PMs, e.g., 
cost per vehicle revenue 
hour  
⭐ Is easy to understand and 
intuitive 
Indexes Individual measures, 
Ratios 
⭐ Allows comparisons across 
similar systems (TCRP 2003) 
Individual measures, e.g., 
ridership  
Cost-efficiency ratios; 
service- 
effectiveness ratios 
⭐ Is low-technology4 Some indexes; Map-
based PMs, e.g., percent 
of vehicle hours serving 
transit-supportive 
corridors. 
Operating PMs, e.g., 
based on trips, miles, 
hour data collected with 
existing, ubiquitous 
technology 
 
4 Among the findings in the 2017 Caltrans Statewide Transit Strategic Plan Stakeholder Engagement Report 
(Matute et al., 2017) was that agency staff are wary of adding new IT systems or processes that require 
training or new vendor integrations. 
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A note about cost inputs to performance measures 
Determining how efficiently a transit system operates is, of course, one of the main 
motivations for using performance measures. It is worth noting, however, that the 
accuracy and usefulness of cost-efficiency measurement depends to a significant 
extent on the quality of inputs used, and the transit cost-allocation model used to 
relate cost inputs (e.g. labor hours, fuel, etc.) to service outputs (e.g. service hours, 
peak vehicles, etc.).  Such models can be (and usually are) simple or (rarely) 
sophisticated, and the degree to which they accurately relate cost inputs to service 
outputs depends both on the quality of data used and the specification of the model.  
Previous research suggests that transit agencies do not allocate capital and operating 
costs like most private transportation organizations (e.g. airlines, shipping companies, 
etc.) to properly account for variable, semi-fixed, and fixed costs. For example, vehicle 
depreciation is typically included in marginal cost calculations, while fixed costs like 
management costs are typically excluded.  In public transit, the opposite is the case; 
capital and operating costs are distinguished by the rules of subsidy programs such 
that all operating costs are included in cost (and performance measures) and all capital 
costs are excluded (Taylor, Garrett, & Iseki, 2000). This conventional cost-allocation 
practice in the transit industry has significant implications for transit decision-making: 
the most common cost-allocation models are so-called average cost models that 
predict adding or removing an hour or a thousand hours of service in both the peak 
and off-peak would change costs by the same (average) unit cost per hour. But 
research shows that marginal cost of transit service varies substantially by the size of 
the change, time of day, direction, and mode.  As a result, measured costs per unit of 
service may be significantly at odds with actual changes in costs.  
 
While the focus of this report is on performance measures and not cost allocation 
modelling, the foregoing does suggest that, whatever performance measures are 
analyzed, the degree to which they reflect actual performance depends significantly on 
how they are calculated. 
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Summary 
There are many performance measures in the transit industry. Choosing which ones to 
use in performance assessment is important because, in addition to tracking 
performance, they have an influence on managerial decision-making and sometimes 
effectively become de facto goals. Criteria for the most effective types of performance 
measures (irrespective of what they measure), drawn from academic literature, 
include ease of calculation and ease of understanding. We discuss that no single 
performance measure is perfect. Although cost-effective measures are the most 
comprehensive, none sufficiently tracks on its own the full scope and scale of transit 
management outcomes. In the next section (Section 4), we look at how current TDA 
performance measures are working.  
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4. How current TDA performance measures 
are working 
As outlined in Section 1, to track agency performance and to make funding 
determinations, the TDA uses two performance measures: the farebox ratio and the 
CPI escalation cap. Both are “threshold” measures requiring operators to remain above 
or below the prescribed limit to be in compliance and eligible for state funding. The 
farebox ratio requirement applies to both STA and LTF funds; the CPI escalation cap 
applies to STA funds only.  
 
Farebox ratio requirement 
The farebox ratio is the most common financial performance measure among 
California transit agencies and is used widely across the U.S. (Rodier & Issac, 2016). It is 
a long-established measure, with origins in the early days of transit when systems 
were private and for-profit.  Although as used today it does not properly incorporate 
capital costs (as noted above), the farebox ratio for decades provided the simplest and 
most straightforward measure of profitability: managers could express simple profits in 
terms of however much the ratio exceeded 100% (though today transit providers 
rarely come close to covering even their operating costs).  
 
Advantages 
Today, the farebox ratio is "used to strike a balance between keeping transit service 
affordable and having an agency (and particularly its direct users) cover as much of the 
costs as possible" (TCRP, 2003, p. 313). As a cost-effectiveness measure, it is a useful 
summary indicator of efficiency (i.e., what quantity of output is achieved for a given 
cost input) and effectiveness (i.e., what quantity of supplied output is used) for agency 
managers.   
 
From a managerial perspective, farebox recovery provides flexibility. Managers can 
improve their agency’s farebox ratio in several ways: 1) increasing ridership, 2) 
increasing fare revenues, 3) reducing operating costs. The outcomes from any one or 
all of these managerial decisions can be desirable, and explain the appeal of the 
measure and the likely reason for the TDA’s adoption of the farebox ratio in 1978.  
 
Limitations  
As is true of any single performance measure, the farebox ratio is not perfect and its 
limitations are exacerbated when it is used in isolation, as it is in the current TDA.  
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One of the farebox ratio’s most significant limitations in state performance assessment 
is that, as a composite cost-effectiveness measure (that combines cost-efficiency 
inputs and service effectiveness outputs), it provides too little information on its own 
about why the metric is high or low. A low ratio could be the result of either high costs 
or low ridership and/or low revenue; it is not possible to tell with the measure alone.   
 
The CPI cost escalation limit 
Applied to STA funds only, the CPI cost escalation limit is a threshold requirement that 
has the advantage of clarity and effect: it forces agencies to work to limit costs to rising 
no higher than the rate of inflation. Its weakness is that in the absence of other goals, it 
does not reward and even constrains decisions that would result in more transit 
service supply (routes, span, and frequency of service) or in more service consumption 
(ridership). The CPI cost escalation limit appears to be unique to California; no other 
state uses such a measure to constrain costs. Pennsylvania uses a (fixed) multiplier to 
increase base levels of funding to each transit agency, though. 
 
The use of threshold requirements 
“Threshold” requirements are generally problematic. They provide no incentive for 
performing better than the prescribed standard. Moreover, when threshold measures 
are combined with penalties, managers have a strong incentive (or even compulsion) 
to avoid reaching the threshold by taking drastic actions (such as cutting service) that 
are counterproductive in the long-term. This (rational but undesirable) response could 
be called “managing to the measure.”   
 
Our survey of transportation professionals, discussed in Section 5, suggests that the 
threshold requirement of the farebox recovery rate in particular has caused significant 
distress at some agencies and has driven decisions to cut service. Agencies without 
local option sales tax (LOST) revenue are especially affected, and reported significantly 
more distress in meeting the threshold requirements, as shown in Figure 5.2. Note that 
the farebox recovery rate requirement in particular causes distress; the CPI escalation 
cap—applicable only to the smaller source of STA funds—appears to be of less 
concern.5 
 
In contexts where agencies have exhausted best practices for cost-efficient operations 
and further cuts are constrained by labor contracts, improving the farebox recovery 
 
5 Nearly 54% of our agency survey respondents reported that, in the past five years, their agency 
experienced difficult meeting the farebox recovery rate; only 16% reported difficulty meeting the CPI 
cost escalation limit requirement. In addition, nine (17%) reported having been penalized by the farebox 
recovery ratio, while none reported penalties from the CPI cost escalation requirement.  
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rate means increasing fares or increasing ridership. Increasing fares will decrease 
ridership, but “increasing ridership” with lower fares carries the risk of not drawing 
enough riders to improve the farebox ratio. Cutting service is therefore a safer way to 
stay in compliance for agencies facing penalties.  
 
A larger problem with threshold requirements is that they are difficult to enforce.  
Withholding all subsidies as a consequence for not meeting standards would be 
difficult to do, as it is a “death penalty” that triggers a viscious cycle for transit 
operations (Taylor, 1995). Such a death penalty would punish riders in a given service 
area, who have essentially no control over the performance of their transit operator or 
the envionment within which the transit system operates. Punishing transit users with 
drastic funding cuts to the systems on which many of them rely for mobility is both 
difficult to justify normatively, and is likely to push transit customers away from transit 
and onto other modes. 
 
Exemptions and their implications for the TDA 
Over the decades, as transit productivity has generally eroded while operating 
environments friendly to driving and hostile to public transit have expanded, operators 
have struggled to reach the performance threshold. As a result, exemptions have 
proliferated that allow transit operators to continue receiving funding, but have 
changed the calculus of that funding, sometimes problematically. A recent amendment 
to STA funding eligibility, for example, requires that operators not meeting the 
threshold must allocate an amount equal to the shortfall to capital expenses, 
potentially making it even more difficult for operators to contain operating costs below 
previous years’ (for example, if the addition of a new bus to the fleet actually increases 
overall and maintenance costs).  
 
The frequent amendments to the TDA performance requirements over the years have 
collectively created a complex and ambiguous set of policy signals and raised some 
basic questions about California’s goals for public transit, and the manner by which 
programs like the TDA advance those goals. The selection of a cost-effectiveness 
measure like the farebox recovery rate early in the life of the TDA suggests that 
supporting and encouraging cost-effective transit service was a principal, if not the 
primary goal of the funding program. Is that a central state goal for public transit today?  
 
Certainly, all things being equal, cost-efficiently delivering transit service that attracts 
riders is ideal. But all things are not equal. State officials have committed to doubling 
transit use and providing greener alternatives to driving (Caltrans, 2015). Moreover, the 
state’s transportation plan seeks to “improve multimodal mobility and accessibility for 
all people,” “foster livable and healthy communities and promote social equity,” and 
“practice environmental stewardship” (Caltrans, 2016). Perhaps most significantly, 
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through the passage of SB 375 in 2008, transit has become a major component in the  
effort to substantially reduce the state’s greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
These commitments suggest that objectives beyond simply providing cost-effective 
service should factor into decisions concerning the levels of subsidy and delivery of 
public transit in California. The fact that the requirements for meeting the farebox 
recovery requirement have been altered and amended so many times over the years 
attests to the need for greater flexibility. In this context, the TDA’s performance 
requirements that focus solely on cost-effectiveness are arguably increasingly out of 
alignment with the larger goals for the state’s transit program.   
 
Aligning goals with performance measures 
Table 4.1 below shows hypothetically how different categories of performance 
measures (discussed in Section 3) align with some of the goals for transit most 
frequently used in the US (Taylor & Morris, 2015). Note that most goals call for service-
effectiveness performance measures, and that the current TDA performance measures 
(the farebox ratio and CPI cost escalation limit) appear to align with only one of the 
state’s goals and only one of the goals most common among transit agencies. 
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Table 4.1  Goal and performance measure alignment 
GOAL COST- 
EFFICIENCY 
PMs 
SERVICE- 
EFFECTIVENESS 
PMs 
COST- 
EFFECTIVENESS 
PMs 
CURRENT TDA  
PMs 
State goals 
Manage and operate an 
efficient integrated system  ᤰᤱ   ᤰᤱ  ᤰᤱ 
Double transit trips   ᤰᤱ  ᤰᤱ  
Improve multimodal 
mobility and accessibility 
for all people 
  ᤰᤱ   
Provide a green alternative 
to driving   ᤰᤱ   
Foster livable and healthy 
communities and promote 
social equity 
  ᤰᤱ   
Common agency goals (Taylor & Morris, 2015) 
Provide service to and 
mobility for all residents   ᤰᤱ   
Improve quality/reliability 
of service   ᤰᤱ   
Provide cost-efficient/ 
efficient services  ᤰᤱ   ᤰᤱ  ᤰᤱ 
Build regional 
perspective/connectivity   ᤰᤱ   
Provide service for the 
poor/transit dependent 
residents 
  ᤰᤱ   
Increase ridership   ᤰᤱ   
Improve mobility for 
seniors and disabled   ᤰᤱ   
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Summary 
The TDA’s use of “threshold” performance requirements in general are problematic 
because they distort (and crimp) management incentives. In addition, the farebox ratio 
is more useful as a tool for agency managers rather than for state transit performance 
assessment and funding. The TDA’s CPI cost escalation cap helps keep costs in line 
with inflation but also constrains managerial flexibility sometimes needed for service 
improvements and expansion. The TDA’s numerous accumulated exemptions to its 
performance requirements underscore the need for a holistic re-examination of those 
requirements so that they better align with the state’s contemporary goals for transit, 
which are considerably broader than they were at the time of the TDA’s establishment.   
 
In the next section, we provide the results of our survey of California transit 
professionals and discuss what they say about the current TDA performance measures 
and their influence on transit agency decision-making. 
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5. What California transit professionals say 
about TDA performance measures 
We conducted an online survey of transit professionals to uncover how well they think 
TDA performance measures work and what unintended consequences the current 
performance measurements and audit requirements might have on managerial 
decision-making. The California Transit Association (CTA) e-mailed a link to our 13-32 
question online survey6 to 80 of its CTA public transit system members and to RTPA 
members of the California Association of Councils of Governments on April 23, 2019.  
The CTA sent 2 follow-up emails during the 23-day period in which the survey was 
open and closed the survey on May 16, 2019. The survey received responses from 116 
transit professionals, of whom 67 worked at transit agencies and 49 worked at RTPAs.   
 
This section describes our findings from the survey concerning how transit 
professionals perceive the effectiveness of current TDA performance measures. 
Section 6 of this report describes comments we received in the survey concerning 
performance audits.  
 
Perception of performance measurement burdens 
A plurality of survey respondents indicated that the TDA’s requirements in general, and 
the farebox recovery rate in particular, are increasingly difficult to meet.  
 
As shown in Figure 5.1, most (64%) of respondents reported that meeting TDA 
requirements at their agency has become “much more difficult” (36%) or “more 
difficult” (28%) over the past five years.   
 
 
6 The number of questions varied based on responses to certain questions. Respondents who identified 
themselves as working at agency professionals received a longer version of the survey.  
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Figure 5.1  Responses to “Over the past five years, meeting TDA requirements at 
my agency has become....” 
(n=53) 
 
Breaking this result down by whether or not the respondent’s agency was located in a 
county that had a local option sales tax (LOST) with funding for transportation, we find 
that 81% from counties without a LOST found it more difficult or much more difficult to 
meet TDA requirements over the past 5 years, compared with 55% from agencies in 
counties with a LOST, as shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2  Responses to meeting TDA requirements by county transportation 
sales tax status 
(n=31) 
 
 
 
Of those seven agencies that reported being penalized by TDA farebox recovery rate 
requirements, five are located in counties without a LOST and the other two are 
located in counties (Tulare and Stanislaus) that devote less than 10 percent of their 
sales tax revenues to transit (Lederman, Brown, Albrecht, Taylor, & Wachs, 2017).  
 
Furthermore, 31 percent of respondents reported their agency has decreased/delayed 
or cancelled vehicle service hours in order to meet TDA eligibility requirements, and 29 
percent had done so for vehicle revenue miles. As shown in Figure 5.3, agencies have 
also reportedly decreased/delayed (35%) or cancelled (4%) transit route extensions 
and have decreased/delayed (30%) or canceled (10%) new transit routes.  
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Figure 5.3  Reported responses to meeting TDA requirements in the past five 
years 
 (n = 52) 
 
 
Survey respondents identified the farebox recovery requirement (FRR) as causing a 
greater challenge to meet than other TDA requirements: as shown in Figure 5.4, 59 
percent of agency respondents reported their agency experienced difficulty meeting 
the FRR, 22 percent reported difficulty meeting the CPI cost escalation limit, 11 percent 
responded that TDA limits on operations funding cause difficulty.  
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Figure 5.4   Responses to “In the last five years, has your agency experienced 
difficulty meeting any of the following funding requirements?” 
(n=54) 
 
Several respondents noted that an inability to raise fares without losing ridership 
means that many agencies can meet the FRR only by adding local support, which, in 
the words of one respondent, “penalizes those agencies that don't have a lot of money.  
It is often those agencies that ‘need’ more help providing services to lower income 
constituents.”   
 
Other respondents noted the effect of the FRR on decision-making at their agencies. 
One transit agency professional wrote: “Route or service planning is difficult because 
Staff is torn between providing the services needed by so many (transit-dependent 
riders) and cutting services to just those that meet FRR standards, removing reasonable 
access to routes, further dropping ridership, resulting in an ever decreasing system.”  
 
Apparent effects of performance measurement burdens 
Most agencies, whether penalized or non-penalized, report taking no specific action in 
the past five years to meet the TDA eligibility requirements. However, among agencies 
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that did take action, significant differences appear in the responses between those 
agencies that have been penalized and those that have not been.7  
 
As shown in Table 5.1, a total of 14 percent of penalized agencies canceled vehicle 
revenue hours (VRH) compared to none of the non-penalized agencies. Penalized 
agencies were also more likely to cancel vehicle revenue miles (VRM) than non-
penalized agencies. Of penalized agencies, 14% reported canceling VRM and another 
14% reported decreasing/delaying VRM, whereas no non-penalized agencies reported 
canceling VRM (though 30% reported decreasing/delaying mileage). 
 
In addition, 7% of non-penalized agencies reported increasing some transit route 
extensions, and 12% reported increasing new transit routes to try to meet TDA 
requirements. In contrast, no penalized agencies reported increasing transit route 
extensions or new transit routes.  
 
Table 5.1  Agency actions undertaken to meet TDA requirements by status of 
penalty 
ACTIONS REPORTED TO 
MEET TDA REQUIREMENTS 
PENALIZED AGENCIES NON-PENALIZED 
AGENCIES 
Canceled vehicle revenue 
hours (VRH) 
14% 0% 
Canceled vehicle revenue 
miles (VRM) 
14% 0% 
Increased transit route 
extensions 
0% 7% 
Increased new transit 
routes 
0% 12% 
 
That penalized agencies appear to respond to penalties by reducing service and/or 
foregoing service extensions suggests that penalties are not effective mechanisms for 
achieving the policy goal of improved transit service, at least in the short-term.  
 
Moreover, that most agencies report making no adjustments in order to meet TDA 
eligibility requirements and that most adjustments made result in decreased/delayed 
or cancelled service suggests that eligibility requirements themselves might be 
counterproductive to improving overall transit service. 
 
 
7 All penalized respondents reported being penalized by the farebox recovery rate; none reported 
being affected by the CPI cost escalation requirement. 
44 
Stated preferences for alternative performance 
measurements 
We subsequently asked respondents to describe their support or opposition to the use 
of each of eight other performance measures in place of the existing farebox recovery 
rate (FRR) and/or the CPI cost escalation requirement. These other performance 
measures were: 
 
• Passenger miles traveled 
• Unlinked passenger trips (UPT) 
• Passengers per revenue-vehicle hour 
• Passengers per revenue-vehicle mile 
• Subsidy per passenger 
• Operating ratio (all revenue divided by all costs) 
• Operating cost per vehicle run 
• Fare revenue per passenger 
 
Survey respondents expressed the highest level of support for both passenger miles 
traveled (PMT) and passengers per revenue-vehicle hour; as shown in Figure 5.5, 43% 
of respondents either strongly supported or supported these metrics. Unlinked 
passenger trips (UPT) had nearly as much support, with 38% strongly supporting or 
supporting the metric.   
 
Respondents were notably more strongly opposed to operating cost per vehicle run as 
a metric than any other, with 20% strongly opposed, and 24% opposed. Overall, more 
respondents (44%) were opposed to fare revenue per passenger than any other metric, 
though less strongly: 34% opposed and 11% strongly opposed it.  
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Figure 5.5  Levels of support or opposition to potential replacements for farebox 
recovery rate and/or CPI cost escalation limit  
(n = 78) 
 
In general, performance metrics related to outputs (service consumption) were more 
favored than those that concerned inputs (such as cost or fares). It is possible this 
preference reflects a perception among agency managers that they have more 
influence over ridership than over controlling costs or fares, both of which are often 
fixed by long-term contracts and/or governed by an agency’s board.   
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Summary 
We surveyed California transit agency and RTPA agency professionals. A plurality of 
respondents told us that the TDA’s requirements in general and the farebox ratio 
requirement in particular are increasingly difficult to meet. Nearly one-third of all agency 
respondents reported decreasing, delaying, or cancelling transit service in order to meet 
TDA eligibility requirements.   
Respondents from counties without a local option sales tax (LOST) reported difficulty in 
significantly higher numbers; in addition, five of the seven agencies that reported being 
penalized were in counties without a LOST. Penalized agencies appear to respond to 
penalties by reducing service and/or foregoing service expansions. 
When asked about their preferences for alternative performance measures, respondents 
most favored output-oriented metrics like passenger miles traveled (PMT) and passengers 
per revenue-vehicle hour, and most opposed the input-oriented metrics of operating cost 
per vehicle run and fare revenue per passenger. 
In the next section (Section 6), we discuss what performance measures other states use. 
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6. What other states use for performance 
measurement 
We also studied several states that are most similar to California in their funding 
contributions to transit, i.e., states that spend at least $200 million annually on transit 
operations, including at least 10% from state-controlled funds, and have at least 10 
transit operators in the state, as recorded in the National Transit Database (NTD). The 
states meeting these criteria are: Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin.8  
 
Figure 6.1 below illustrates that our selected states vary widely from Florida, with a low 
share of operating funding from the state but a high number of transit operators, to 
Connecticut, with a high share of state funding to cover operating expenses but a 
relatively small number of transit operators. For comparison, California has a percent 
of state operating funding of approximately 14% and 158 transit operators in the NTD 
(which is such an outlier that we have omitted California from the chart). 
  
 
8 The California State Legislature also requested that we examine Maryland and North Carolina.  
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Figure 6.1  Selected states’ transit operations funding and number of operators 
 
Methodology 
We first reviewed current academic and policy literature, which focused more on the 
sources of revenues and finance mechanisms for transit than on the funding allocation 
to transit operators. (Our efforts to review reports on differences in transit funding 
allocation across states were hampered as much of this literature was outdated as 
many states have recently implemented mechanisms to increase state revenues for 
transportation.) 
 
We then reviewed state transportation law to determine whether state law mandated 
any allocation formula or performance review metrics. We then researched state 
department of transportation websites, state budget analyses, and any required 
reporting by transit agencies. For additional context, we referenced third-party 
sources and took note of any press releases, policy reports, or media coverage that 
gave some indication of recent or forthcoming changes to transit funding models and 
disbursement/allocation methods. 
 
For each state, we first identified the number, size, and type of transit operators in the 
state.  We found that, unlike California, many states have one large urban operator and 
many rural operators. In these cases, we noted that the methods of allocating funding 
and the use of performance metrics are distinctly different for urban and rural 
agencies. We next outlined any state law provisions related to transportation finance 
and performance evaluation and summarized any recent legislation. We noted how 
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revenues are distributed to transit operators by the state, drawing attention to any 
allocation by formula or performance. We then summarized transit operator reporting 
requirements, any measures used for tracking agency performance over time, and any 
performance goals set by the state. Detailed summaries of our findings for each state 
are contained in the Appendix. The next section summarizes our seven key overall 
findings. 
 
Key Findings 
1. Most states do not use performance measures to allocate funding 
Our research found that California’s mechanism for allocating transit funding is largely 
unique in its use of performance measures. No other state uses a single, unweighted, 
“threshold” performance measure (e.g., the farebox recovery rate) to determine 
eligibility for funding. 
 
Of the 13 states we studied, eight tracked performance measures for at least one 
statewide transit funding program. In many states, the state department of 
transportation or a state commission or commissioner has the discretion to choose 
which performance measures to use. Some states (Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) have specific performance measures (or goals, in 
Massachusetts’ case) codified in state law.  
 
Although most states use performance measures, they do not apply them uniformly 
across all transit systems. Except for Pennsylvania, all states fund urban and rural 
systems separately; performance measures often apply to urban systems, for example, 
but not rural ones. In addition, most states have separate programs for specific 
populations; we examined only the programs that used allocation formulas. 
 
In addition, most states use performance measures only for assessment and not to 
determine state transit funding allocations. Only two states we studied (North Carolina 
and Pennsylvania) use performance measures to allocate funding, and only 
Pennsylvania9 uses performance measures in its general allocation of all statewide 
transit funds.10  
 
 
9 As of July 1, 2019, Virginia law describes “performance-based funding” for transit. The law delegates 
the specification of “service delivery factors, based on effectiveness and efficiency” to the 
Commonwealth Transportation Board (CTB). However, the current metrics used are better described as 
“system characteristics”, e.g., revenue vehicle hours, ridership, etc. Please see Appendix for details. 
10 Although performance measures are used in Pennsylvania’s general funding allocations, a “hold 
harmless” provision provides a funding backstop to Pennsylvania’s agencies, guaranteeing agencies 
some stability in funding regardless of performance.  
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Table 6.1 lists common performance measures and the states in which they are used in 
at least one transit funding program; states that use a given performance measure in 
their funding allocation are in bold. As the table shows, the most common cost-
efficiency measures are operating cost per revenue mile and operating cost per 
revenue hour. The most common service-effectiveness measures are passengers per 
revenue-vehicle hour and passengers per revenue-vehicle mile. The most common 
cost-effectiveness measure is operating cost per passenger trip. Notably, the farebox 
recovery ratio is used in only two of the thirteen states studied.  
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Table 6.1  Performance measures used in at least one transit funding program 
PM TYPE PERFORMANCE MEASURE* STATES THAT USE PM** 
Cost-efficiency 
Operating cost per revenue mile FL, IL, MA, MD, NY 
Operating cost per revenue hour FL, MD, PA, WI 
Operating cost per vehicle trip NC 
Service- 
effectiveness 
Passengers per revenue-vehicle hour IL, MD, NC, PA, WI 
Passengers per revenue-vehicle mile MD, NY 
Cost-effectiveness 
Operating cost per passenger trip FL, MD, PA, WI  
Farebox recovery ratio (%) MA, WI 
Operating ratio MD, NY 
Fare revenue per passenger IL 
Operating revenue per revenue vehicle hour PA 
*We omitted performance measures related to safety (monitored by three states) and travel time 
reliability (monitored by two states) from this chart because they are not well-defined metrics. 
**Boldface indicates in what states the performance measure is used in funding allocations. 
 
 
2. Funding allocations use system characteristics more than 
performance measures 
 
States more commonly use system characteristics, such as revenue vehicle miles, 
ridership, or simply area population, than they do performance measures.   
 
System characteristics differ from performance measures in that they refer to 
attributes of a transit operating context that are important to its function and funding 
needs but are largely if not entirely outside the direct influence of transit managers and 
only weakly tied to agency decision-making. In other words, system characteristics 
reflect the geographic and/or demographic demand for transit service but usually not 
the quality, effectiveness, or efficiency of its supply.  
 
As shown in Table 6.2, the most commonly used system characteristic metrics for 
funding allocation are: ridership/unlinked passenger trips, revenue vehicle miles, 
percent of residents with access to transit, and revenue vehicle hours. 
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Table 6.2  Most common system characteristics and states of their usage  
SYSTEM CHARACTERISTIC 
 
IMPUTED MANAGEMENT 
GOAL 
STATES*  
 
Ridership/unlinked 
passenger trips Increase ridership CT, IL, FL, MA, PA, TN, VA11 
Revenue vehicle miles Increase service coverage FL, IL, PA, TN, VA, WI12 
Percent of residents with 
access to transit 
Increase service in dense 
areas FL, MA, WI13 
Revenue vehicle hours Increase service IL, PA, VA 
Local funding (None) NC, FL 
Population (UZA) (None) TN, FL 
Number of scheduled trips Increase service hours MA 
Senior passenger premium Increase service to seniors PA 
Operating cost (Ambivalent) VA14 
System area (None) FL 
Passenger miles traveled 
Increase ridership on long 
routes VA15 
*Boldface indicates the system characteristic is used in funding allocations. 
 
 
In several cases, where system characteristics are used for allocating funding, but 
performance measures are not (Florida, New York, and Tennessee), the state’s transit 
funding is based on factors that are mostly outside the direct influence of transit 
managers.  
 
Table 6.3 illustrates the combinations of usage in performance measures and system 
characteristics used across the states we studied. A few states use performance 
measures and system characteristics for all or some of their funding determinations 
(Categories I & II). A few more use only system characteristics for funding purposes 
(Category III). In some states (Category IV), neither performance measures nor system 
characteristics determine funding; they are used solely for assessment purposes. 
Finally, some states use one or the other for limited purposes (Categories V and VI).  
 
11 Bus systems only. 
12 Wisconsin recommends that agencies use “the ratio of revenue hours to service area population”, i.e., 
revenue hours per capita. 
13 Wisconsin recommends that agencies use the similar metric of “the ratio of passengers, as expressed in 
unlinked trips to service area population,” i.e., passengers per capita. 
14 Bus systems only. 
15 Commuter rail systems only. 
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Table 6.3  Categories of performance measures and system characteristics usage 
in allocating transit funding  
 CATEGORY  
I 
CATEGORY 
II 
CATEGORY 
III 
CATEGORY 
IV 
CATEGORY 
V 
CATEGORY 
VI 
Performance 
measures 
used for 
allocating 
funding 
Yes, for all 
state transit 
funding 
Yes, within 
certain 
programs 
only 
No, for 
assessment 
only 
No, for 
assessment 
only 
Not used No, for 
assessment 
only 
System 
characteristics 
used for 
allocating 
funding 
Yes, for all 
state transit 
funding 
Yes, within 
certain 
programs 
only  
Yes, within 
certain 
programs 
only  
No, for 
assessment 
only 
Yes, within 
certain 
programs 
only  
Not used 
States in 
category 
Pennsylvania 
 
 
N. Carolina 
 
Florida 
New York 
 
Illinois 
Mass. 
Maryland 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Tennessee 
Virginia16 
Connecticut 
Wisconsin 
 
Note that, as mentioned previously, most states distinguish between urban and non-
urban transit operations in their funding allocations. As Table 6.3 shows, only 
Pennsylvania applies the same performance measures and system characteristics 
criteria to all transit systems regardless of operating context.  
Examples of state transit funding allocations  
Pennsylvania 
As mentioned above, Pennsylvania uses both performance measures and system 
characteristics to determine general across-the-board funding allocations. 
 
Pennsylvania’s law (Act 44) establishes a framework for measuring agency 
performance (Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 2018). Agencies set their 
own targets; the Bureau of Public Transportation (part of the state transportation 
agency, PennDOT) conducts performance reviews of each agency and provides 
technical assistance on meeting goals. The formula Pennsylvania uses for allocating 
funds is based on individual transit system characteristics but requires that each 
 
16 Virginia first splits funding between urban and rural systems, but then applies the same formulas to each. 
Its state law delegates the determination of funding to its Commonwealth Transportation Board which must 
use “service delivery factors, based on effectiveness and efficiency” in its funding determinations; these are 
reviewed every three years. The current factors used are system characteristics such as ridership, operating 
cost, and revenue vehicle miles/hours.  
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system meet performance goals relative to past performance and peer group 
performance. PennDOT has the discretion to withhold funding from systems that fail to 
meet their performance goals. The performance measures that Pennsylvania uses to 
assess individual agencies’ performance relative to their peer groups’ include: 
 
● Passengers per revenue vehicle hour 
● Operating costs per revenue vehicle hour 
● Operating revenue per revenue vehicle hour 
● Operating costs per passenger 
Virginia 
Effective as of July 1, 2019, all state transit operating funds are distributed “on the basis 
of service delivery factors, based on effectiveness and efficiency…”, evaluated every 
three years and announced one year in advance of their adoption. The state’s new 
methodology uses system characteristics weighted by system size relative to other 
state agencies.  The weights are calculated with the following formula: 
 
Agency size-weight = (Sum of Agency Sizing Metric / Statewide Totals) * Weight  
 
Performance measures differ by mode as follows: 
BUS SYSTEMS COMMUTER RAIL SYSTEMS  
● Operating cost (50%) 
● Ridership (30%) 
● Revenue vehicle hours (10%) 
● Revenue vehicle miles (10%) 
● Passenger miles traveled (33%) 
● Revenue vehicle hours (33%) 
● Revenue vehicle miles (33%) 
 
North Carolina (State Maintenance and Assistance Program) 
North Carolina uses performance measures to allocate some of its transit funding 
through specific programs. Its State Maintenance and Assistance Program (SMAP) 
disburses funds according to the following formula (North Carolina Department of 
Transportation, 2018):  
● 10% equal share  
● 30% local commitment  
● 60% performance  
○ 30% trips relative to the statewide average17  
 
17 This is presented by North Carolina as a performance metric, but under our rubric we would consider it a 
system characteristic. 
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○ 30% net cost per trip relative to the statewide average18  
 
More details about these and other states’ allocation formulas are available in the 
Appendix. 
 
3. Allocation formulas are most often used for specific state 
programs 
We also found that most states do not use allocation formulas as a basis for general 
transit operations funding. Allocations are instead made within a subset of the state’s 
transit services, i.e., for either urban transit systems or for specific targeted operations 
programs, such as services under the ADA or for the elderly.   
 
Large urban systems are typically funded by a combination of dedicated revenue 
streams from both state and local sources. For example, New York MTA and Illinois 
RTA are funded partially by a regional tax and MBTA in Massachusetts receives a 
dedicated 1% of the state sales tax.   
 
Most states we reviewed did not use formulas to fund rural operators; states only 
provided matching funding for FTA grants or provided funds to cover operator deficits.  
 
4. California’s transit context differs from most other states’ due to 
its distinct geography and history 
California is distinct geographically from almost all the states we studied. California has 
multiple regions with many and comparatively large transit systems. This is shown in 
Figure 6.2, which charts the number of both Census-designated Urbanized Areas 
(UZAs) and transit operators that are recipients of federal funding in the top 25 
states/regions. No other state has as many UZAs or transit operators as California. 
Florida, the state with the second-most operators and that is most like California in its 
multicentric geography, has fewer than half as many UZAs and operators as California. 
 
The contrast is even starker across other states. Many of the states we studied have a 
single large operator and many rural operators, presenting a significantly different 
funding landscape. In many of these states (e.g. Massachusetts, New York, Maryland), 
the large urban provider is funded through a dedicated revenue stream and/or line 
item legislative appropriations. Rural transit providers generally receive a lower 
percentage of funding from state sources, typically used as matching funds for FTA 
grants, with funding distributed based on ridership or system size (system 
characteristics). 
 
18 Defined as total expenses minus fares and other operating revenues divided by total trips. 
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Figure 6.2  Number of UZAs and Transit Operators, Top 25 State/Regions 
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Most state transit finance systems were developed relatively recently compared to 
California; the longevity of the TDA additionally differentiates California from most of 
the other states we reviewed. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Illinois, and 
North Carolina all had major overhauls of transit funding mechanisms since 2007, 
partially in reaction to the scarcity of federal transportation funding. In these states we 
found movement towards implementing performance measures through legislation. As 
for the remainder of the states, New York and Iowa have both had their transit funding 
systems since 1993 (barring minor amendments), and Florida’s DTTF program has been 
in place since 1989.  The history of Ohio and Tennessee’s funding schemas are 
unknown. 
5. Some states use peer comparisons in their allocations 
We also find that in some states, or for some programs, performance measures are 
benchmarked by “peer groups.”  In Pennsylvania, performance measures linked to 
funding are benchmarked on performance relative to peers, both statewide and 
nationwide. These measures are: (i) Total revenue hours, (ii) Total revenue miles, (iii) 
Vehicles in maximum service, and (iv) Service area population. Both the Illinois RTA 
and the Maryland MTA also evaluate transit performance relative to “peer” systems 
nationwide, though these comparisons are not used for funding allocation. 
 
In North Carolina, urban transit funding programs use performance measurements to 
determine how to distribute funding among operators statewide. Available state 
funding is proportionally allocated among operators using a combination of 
performance measures and system characteristics. These formulas allocate greater 
amounts of funding to both larger and better-performing transit systems.  
 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina’s ROAP Program and Florida’s TDTF proportionally 
allocate funding to transit systems within the state based solely on system 
characteristics.19 For example, allocating funding based on a specific transit system’s 
share of all transit trips taken statewide. 
 
6. Many states provide backstops for transit funding  
Even where funding is allocated on performance metrics or single measurements, we 
find that states frequently include provisions that ensure that transit agencies do not 
receive less funding year to year even if performance standards are not met.   
For example, although Pennsylvania transit operators are required to meet 
performance standards, a “hold harmless” provision in the base allocation formula 
 
19 New York allocates bus system funding based on absolute, as opposed to comparative, system 
measurements. Transit operators receive a fixed amount per passenger and per revenue vehicle mile. 
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ensures that no system will receive less funding than in prior years if it meets its 
performance requirements. Where performance decreases, the department of 
transportation can waive required funding reductions, and agencies can have two 
years to improve their performance or apply for another waiver.  
 
Similarly, rural transit operators in Massachusetts are assured funding based on 
historical levels.   
 
7. California is different from other states 
California is different. The fact that California has multiple major metropolitan centers 
immediately distinguishes it from nearly every other state. No single operator 
dominates transit as it does in some states, where transit funding allocations are 
prescribed by its needs.   
 
As a result, only one state we studied has a directly-relevant method of transit 
allocation: Pennsylvania.  
 
Pennsylvania blends several approaches: 1) A stable base of funding to each agency 
(based on 2007 levels, and predictably escalated each year), with a 15 percent local 
match requirement; 2) Additional funding based on a system-characteristic driven 
formula; and 3) Funding conditioned on performance reviews and goal-setting relative 
to peer operators on a five-year cycle. Furthermore, the state’s “hold harmless” 
provision guarantees agencies have predictable levels of funding and the opportunity 
to correct shortfalls. Pennsylvania’s approach gives operators stability in funding while 
also keeping them accountable. 
 
Compared with California’s current method of allocating transit funding, Pennsylvania’s 
is simpler, more consistent, and offers transit operators more predictability.  We 
believe adoption of Pennsylvania’s approach in California is possible, though it would 
require a legislative commitment to a) obligating consistent funding to agencies, using a 
universal allocation method across urban and rural areas regardless of population, and 
b) committing to a standard 15% local match requirement. 
 
Compared to the thirteen states we examined, California’s use of a single “threshold” 
performance measure to determine funding eligibility is unusual, as is its use of a CPI 
cost escalation cap. Few other states link funding decisions to performance measures 
at all; performance assessment is considered separately. In addition, all other states we 
studied use multiple performance measures to evaluate system performance, and 
some use peer groups to ensure that cross-agency comparisons are meaningful.  
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Summary 
As this section describes, California stands apart in its use of performance measures, 
possibly a result of California’s unique context but also likely a result of the TDA’s 
nearly half-century history. Many states we studied have developed their methods of 
performance measurement more recently and as a result take advantage of improved 
transit assessment methodologies, the research into which by and large developed 
after the TDA was written. In the following section (Section 7), we take a similar look at 
performance audits, discussing how California’s audit approach compares with other 
states’ and how California’s transit professionals think they are working. 
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7. How California’s performance audits 
compare with other states’ and how 
California transit professionals perceive 
them  
While our main charge from the Legislature was to examine the use of performance 
measures to qualify for state funding, we also examined the related triennial 
performance audits, which historically have been aimed at improving agencies’ 
performance and consider a wider array of performance measures.    
 
As discussed below, we found that few states conduct regular audits and California’s 
extensive use of audits is rare. 
 
Perception of triennial performance audit burdens 
The survey of California transportation professionals we conducted, other results of 
which we discuss in Section 4, also included several questions which invited 
respondents to comment on the current annual and triennial audit processes.  
A total of 39 respondents provided comments on the audits. Their comments reveal a 
wide range of perspectives on the favorability of the audits (triennial in particular).   
Table 7.1 illustrates a breakdown of comments received. 
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Table 7.1  Tally of comments about audits by area of concern  
COMMENT NUMBER OF 
RESPONDENTS’ 
COMMENTS 
PERCENT OF TOTAL 
Favorable (or no concern) 12 31% 
Standardization 8 21% 
Unfavorable (non-specific) 7 18% 
Timing 5 13% 
Cost/bidding 5 13% 
Training 2 5% 
Total 39 100% 
 
 
The largest group of commenters expressed favorable views concerning the current 
triennial audit, finding that it is “smooth,” “fine the way it is,” and “works well.”  These 
respondents liked the overview that the audits provide and its function as a way for 
improvements to be advanced; one respondent commented that the holistic nature of 
the audit allowed for more relevant information to be conveyed. 
 
The second largest group of comments concerned report standardization. 
Respondents wished to see greater alignment with federal reporting and more 
coordination with “a more robust Short Range Transit Plan process” so that agencies 
receive more substantial recommendations on performance improvements while 
reducing the reporting burden. Another respondent noted duplication with the SRTP as 
a reason to eliminate the triennial audit in favor of local standards and the annual fiscal 
audit “to ensure funds are used properly.” In addition, one respondent noted that 
standardizing the interval between triennial audits would be helpful.   
 
Other respondents complained about various aspects of the triennial audit. Most 
concerns centered on timing and a lack of synchrony among NTD, SCO, TDA and 
GASB data requirements. Several respondents made comments similar to this one: “it 
would be helpful if the State Controller’s report process was better aligned with the 
NTD reporting process, both in terms of timing and content (e.g., we report three 
modes to NTD, but only two to the SCO, so the numbers never match up).” 
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Another respondent noted that the January 31 deadline is not workable for audits in 
that region, which are not completed until March 31 (using the extension).  Several 
other respondents asked for a later deadline for the SCO reports to allow for financial 
reports to be completed so as to avoid “revisions and/or inaccurate information.”  
One respondent complained that three-year old data are too out of date to use for 
developing funding allocations and that more frequent (annual or bi-annual) audits 
would be more helpful. 
 
In addition, some respondents expressed concerns about the high cost of triennial 
audits and/or complications in the process of bidding for consultants to perform the 
audits. Two respondents said more training for auditors is needed. 
 
A full set of comments that we received, anonymized and organized by theme, is 
included in the Appendix. 
 
Performance audits in other states 
Other states use a variety of approaches in audits of transit agency performance.20 
Some ambiguity surrounds the term “audit.” Some states use the term to refer to 
externally reviewed documents and verified data; other states use the term in 
reference to evaluations or even reports. Underscoring this ambiguity, the Minnesota 
State Legislature formerly required Transportation System Audits that were, and are 
now called, Transportation System Performance Evaluation reports (Metropolitan 
Council, 2017).  
 
We used California’s de facto definition of “audit”: externally-conducted, regularly-
scheduled, with particular aspects of the audit (i.e., performance measures) specified. 
As stipulated by PUC Section 99246, California’s triennial audit requires that an entity 
“other than itself” evaluate the “efficiency, effectiveness and economy of the operation 
of the entity being audited.” The PUC specifies that the audit shall include a verification 
of performance indicators specified in PUC 99247, specifically: 
 
● Operating cost per passenger 
● Operating cost per vehicle service hour 
● Passengers per vehicle service hour 
● Passengers per vehicle service mile 
● Vehicle service hours per employee 
 
20 We searched for mentions of performance measures and audits both in publicly available documents 
and reports as well as in the relevant sections of each state’s statutes. We excluded those audits 
required by the federal government, such as the OMB “single audit” or those concerning Transit Asset 
Management (TAM). 
63 
 
As shown in Table 7.2, California’s type of audit is rare. Few states require regular 
audits of any kind beyond those required federally. Of the 14 states we studied, only 
three others (Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Maryland) require regular, externally-
conducted audits of their transit operators. (Illinois’ audits appear not to have a specific 
timeframe.) 
 
Of those state audits, most concern protecting public funds and assets from fraud and 
misuse.  Pennsylvania, for example, requires all operating and capital funding grantees 
to complete annual audits performed by a certified public accounting firm, but the 
audit concerns “the level of compliance with regard to the accounting and reporting 
procedures, and the management of grant funds pursuant to PennDOT requirements,” 
not transit performance (Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 2017). 
 
Apart from California, only Wisconsin appears to require audited performance 
measure data, though the state makes allowances for the delay of “several years” for 
audits to be completed and incorporates unaudited data in performance measurement 
reporting in the meantime (Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 2017).  
 
Some other states conduct audits of performance measures, but not regularly. For 
example, the Office of the New York State Comptroller conducted an audit of the 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority/New York City Transit and MTA Bus Company’s 
bus wait times, mean distance between service interruptions, and adherence to the 
agency’s service guidelines manual. The audit, which assessed a 42-month period of 
performance between 2015 and 2018, appears to be unscheduled and single-instance 
(Office Of The New York State Comptroller, 2019). 
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Table 7.2:  Performance measure reporting, audit requirements, and PMs used in 
audits, by state 
STATE REGULAR PM 
REPORTING 
EXTERNAL AUDITS 
REQUIRED (BY STATE) 
NO = NOT FOUND 
PM(S) SPECIFIED IN 
AUDIT REQUIREMENT 
California Annual, Triennial Yes Yes 
Connecticut Quarterly21 No N/A 
Florida Triennial No N/A 
Illinois No Yes; with varied 
frequency 
None 
Maryland Annual Yes, every four years None 
Massachusetts Annual No N/A 
Michigan Annual No N/A 
Minnesota Annual No22 N/A 
New York Annual No N/A 
North Carolina Annual No N/A 
Pennsylvania Annual and 5-year Yes None 
Tennessee No No N/A 
Virginia Annual No N/A 
Wisconsin Annual and 5-year Yes Yes 
  
Note that although few states include performance measures in their audits, most 
states do require regular reporting of performance indicators of the type that California 
includes in the audit verification. (These are discussed in greater detail in Section 4.) 
Many states either require the reports to be public or they are public as a matter of 
practice. (Presumably, this public access provides a degree of accountability.)  In 
 
21 A complete biennial report was last compiled for FY 2002/2003; some performance measures are tracked 
quarterly by mode, however. 
22 Formerly named “Transportation System Audits“ are now described as reports. 
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Florida, agencies must publish each year in a local newspaper their annual 
performance measures (passenger trips, revenue miles, total operating expenses, 
operating revenue, vehicles operated in maximum service, base fare, revenue miles 
between vehicle system failures, days/hours service is available, and operating 
expense per passenger trip) (Florida Department of Transportation, 2016).  
 
Summary 
Our evaluation of other states’ audit methods show that California’s approach to audits 
is somewhat unusual. Most states do not specify performance measurements to be 
used in audits and most do not require regular external audits (relying on performance 
measurement reporting instead).  California transit professionals’ opinions on the 
current audit process are mixed. The most common concerns centered on the 
measures and the reporting deadlines used being “out of sync” with other mandatory 
reporting. We make recommendations for changing the audit process in our next 
section (Section 8).  
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8. Proposed Policy Options  
Motivation for change 
Based on the preceding analysis, we find that the TDA, as currently structured, 
conflicts with a variety of state policies and goals for public transit; specifically: 
1. The state’s goals for transit have changed and broadened considerably since 
1971 when the TDA became law and 1978 when the farebox recovery 
requirement was added; 
2. Our survey of California transportation professionals reveals the current TDA 
requirements appear to influence agency management decisions in ways that 
do not align with the state’s current goals for transit; 
3. Our review of peer states (i.e., states that invest heavily in transit) indicates that 
California does not follow the current best practice in performance assessment. 
 
Accordingly, we recommend that changes be considered in:  
● The specific measurement of performance (the farebox recovery rate) and the 
number of performance measures used;  
● The grouping of peer agencies;  
● How non-compliance is identified; 
● The use and frequency of audits; 
● The consequences for initial and chronic non-compliance. 
 
The funding policies of several states are instructive and Pennsylvania’s in particular is 
a model from which we draw many of the proposed policy options discussed below. 
 
Recommendations 
We present six recommendations concerning transit performance measurement in 
California, discussed in detail below: 
1) Replace the (current one-size-fits-all) farebox recovery rate and CPI cost 
escalation threshold requirements with multiple performance measures that 
align with state goals for public transit 
2) Adopt peer group comparisons 
3) Use standard deviation analysis to identify agency outliers 
4) Use audits to identify specific needs for technical assistance 
5) Provide technical assistance through RTPAs or a state Transit Excellence Center to 
agencies with lagging performance records 
6) Establish a framework and authority for remedial action, including agency 
restructuring. 
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Recommendation #1: Replace the farebox ratio and CPI cost 
escalation threshold requirements with multiple performance 
measurements that align with state goals 
Past research (discussed in Section 3) indicates the importance of selecting appropriate 
performance measures as they become not merely indicators but de facto goals that 
affect outcomes, particularly if they are tied to funding: “what you measure is what you 
get” (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). Importantly, and as Table 3.1 illustrates, no single 
performance measure is sufficient to capture or compare meaningfully the 
performance of transit efficiency and effectiveness. We therefore advise against using 
any single performance measure in isolation.   
 
We propose replacing the farebox ratio in particular because it is an “opaque” 
composite measure: while it provides managers with useful supplemental, summary 
information on their individual agency’s performance, the farebox ratio gives others 
outside an agency no indication of what is behind the measure. Whether the ratio is 
low because costs are high or because ridership and/or revenues are low cannot be 
determined, as those inputs are masked in the ratio. This limitation may explain why, 
although it is a common measure, no other state we studied uses the farebox ratio in 
its transit funding determinations.23   
 
Using multiple performance measurements instead will provide a clearer, more 
transparent, and more comprehensive assessment of transit performance. It is worth 
noting that all 13 states we studied used multiple measurements to assess the 
performance of individual transit agencies.  
 
Based on our examination of other states’ systems, we recommend a blend of the 
following performance metrics (drawn from Pennsylvania and Wisconsin):  
 
● Unlinked passenger trips (UPT)24 per vehicle revenue hour (VRH) 
● Operating expenses (OpEx) per vehicle revenue hour (VRH) 
● Operating revenue (OpREV) per vehicle revenue hour (VRH) 
 
23 Massachusetts and Wisconsin use the farebox ratio in performance assessment but not in funding 
determinations. Maryland recently abandoned the use of the farebox ratio in performance assessment. 
24 Unlinked passenger trips are equivalent to boardings. They do not take into account passenger 
transfers, which introduces the significant measurement problem that many passenger trips are double-
counted. Whether new boardings arise from new passenger demand or from new transfer-forcing 
service changes is not possible to know when UPT is the measure used. The measure of “Linked 
passenger trip,” which count a passenger’s entire origin-to-destination journey as one trip, is superior 
for planning and policy purposes. Though technology is improving how linked trips can be estimated, its 
use has historically been limited by its being more difficult to track, with the result that UPT is more 
commonly used, despite its limitations.   
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● Operating costs (OpEx) per unlinked passenger trip (UPT) 
● Unlinked passenger trips (UPT) per capita  
● Vehicle revenue hours (VRH) per capita  
 
These suggested measures constitute two cost-efficiency measures, three service-
effectiveness measures, and one cost-effectiveness measure.  
 
The use of multiple measures also makes it easier to align performance measurement 
with state goals. We identify three contemporary state goals for transit as: increasing 
ridership, increasing operating efficiency, and increasing effectiveness. While each of 
these goals is individually desirable, a single focus on any one excludes important 
aspects of the others, underscoring the need for multiple measures. Table 8.1 shows 
how each suggested measure aligns with each transit goal:  
 
Table 8.1: Performance measure, type, and goal alignment 
  STATE GOALS ALIGNMENT 
SUGGESTED 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE 
TYPE INCREASE 
RIDERSHIP 
INCREASE 
OPERATING 
EFFICIENCY 
INCREASE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Operating costs (OpEx) per 
vehicle revenue hour (VRH) 
Cost-efficiency   ᤰᤱ  
Operating costs (OpEx) per 
unlinked passenger trip 
(UPT) 
Cost-efficiency   ᤰᤱ  
Unlinked passenger trips 
(UPT) per vehicle revenue 
hour (VRH) 
Service- 
effectiveness 
 ᤰᤱ   ᤰᤱ 
Unlinked passenger trips 
(UPT) per capita  
Service- 
effectiveness 
 ᤰᤱ   ᤰᤱ 
Vehicle revenue hours 
(VRH) per capita  
Service- 
effectiveness 
   ᤰᤱ 
Operating revenue (OpREV) 
per vehicle revenue hour 
(VRH) 
Cost-effectiveness  ᤰᤱ  ᤰᤱ  
 
 
Each performance measure has limitations and will affect some agencies differently 
based on their context. For example, the UPT per VRH and OpEx/UPT metrics will 
favor higher-ridership urban systems.  
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Note that these metrics need not be equally weighted. One or several of the measures 
could be weighted differently to reflect state officials’ priorities. 
 
Local flexibility can mitigate the inequities of a universally-applicable performance 
measure. Two strategies for providing this local flexibility include: 
1. Some or all of the prescribed performance metrics could be locally-determined 
through an MPO or RTPA 
2. Agencies could be evaluated only in relation to their peer group (our next 
recommendation). 
 
 
CURRENT TDA PROPOSED CHANGE ANTICIPATED EFFECT 
● Single performance 
measure used as a 
threshold 
requirement 
● Farebox recovery 
rate used 
 
● Multiple 
performance 
measures used 
● No farebox recovery 
rate used 
● Better identification 
of agency-specific 
problems 
● More 
comprehensive 
performance 
reporting 
● Performance more 
aligned with state 
goals for transit 
 
 
 
Recommendation #2: Adopt peer group comparisons 
Cross-agency performance assessment is more meaningful when agencies are similar 
in operating context and size. Currently, the TDA only distinguishes between urban and 
non-urban operators, with some provisions for urban areas in low-population 
counties. This distinction is too crude in the modern transit operating environment and 
results in “apple-to-orange” comparisons of agencies that operate in vastly different 
contexts.  
 
One method for grouping peers that we believe merits further study is Pennsylvania’s 
method, based on four criteria: 
 
1. Total revenue hours 
2. Total revenue miles 
3. Vehicles in maximum service 
4. Service area population 
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While the exact composition of groups of California’s agencies using these criteria 
would need to be determined, the grouping of similar agencies will provide the state 
with the ability to compare cross-agency performance more meaningfully.  In addition, 
peer groups such as these enable more sophisticated methods of identifying agency-
specific problems. One example of such a method is using standard deviations, our 
next recommendation. 
 
 
CURRENT TDA PROPOSED CHANGE ANTICIPATED EFFECT 
● No peer groups 
(except in broad 
urban, non-urban 
categories) 
● Agencies’ 
performance 
compared only with 
peers 
● More meaningful 
cross-agency 
comparisons 
● Better identification 
of agency-specific 
problems 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation #3: Use standard deviation analysis to identify 
agency outliers 
The TDA currently uses the fare recovery rate and CPI escalation limits to identify 
whether or not agencies are in compliance. As discussed in Section 3, “threshold” 
performance measures like these direct managers’ focus toward not “crossing the line” 
and provide no incentive for performing better than the prescribed standard. 
Moreover, when threshold measures are combined with penalties, managers have a 
strong incentive to avoid reaching the threshold by taking drastic actions (such as 
cutting service) that are counterproductive in the long-term. This (rational but 
undesirable) response could be called “managing to the measure.” 
 
We recommend using standard deviation measurements to identify agencies where 
performance trends are outside of the norm. Several states, including Pennsylvania and 
Wisconsin, use this approach.  
 
Pennsylvania considers agencies to be in compliance when their system performance 
metrics are within one standard deviation of the peer group average. The state 
transportation agency (PennDOT) has the discretion to require an action plan and/or 
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withhold some funding from transit systems with performance measures below one 
standard deviation of the average.25   
 
Identifying out-of-compliance agencies with standard deviations has the advantage of 
preventing agency managers from “managing to the measure” while still allowing the 
state to keep agencies accountable. Sanctions for agencies out of compliance are 
addressed in Recommendations #4, #5, and #6. 
 
CURRENT TDA PROPOSED CHANGE ANTICIPATED EFFECT 
● Thresholds 
determine 
compliance 
● Agencies are either 
in compliance or not  
● Agencies’ 
performance 
measured in 
standard deviations 
from the mean of 
their peer group  
● Fewer management 
incentive distortions 
● Better identification 
of agency-specific 
problems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation #4: Use audits to identify need for technical 
assistance and adjust audit schedule 
The current annual audits present an opportunity to identify where technical assistance 
is needed. We recommend that audits move from serving as compliance checks to 
identify areas of (needed) improvement and long-term goal-setting. The technical 
assistance itself need not be provided by the auditors themselves; rather, we suggest 
that auditors assist agencies in need of improvement with any necessary data 
collection and with receiving technical assistance from the state through a Transit 
Excellence Center (our next recommendation).  
 
In addition, to concentrate audit resources where they are most needed, we suggest 
that current triennial audit intervals be variable and adjusted by the severity of issues. 
Agencies with few or no performance issues, for example, could be audited on a 4- or 
5-year cycle. Agencies that are lagging but not out of compliance could be audited 
every 2-3 years or more frequently.  
 
 
 
25 Provisions (such as waivers) exist to allow agencies to improve performance before their full funding 
is affected. See Appendix for details on the mechanics of Pennsylvania’s funding guarantees and penalty 
withholding. 
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CURRENT TDA PROPOSED CHANGE ANTICIPATED EFFECT 
● Audits used to check 
compliance 
● Audits occur 
annually  
● Use audits to identify 
areas in need of 
improvement and/or 
technical assistance 
● Audit intervals vary 
based on level of 
compliance 
● Improved use of 
agency resources 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation #5 Provide technical assistance through RTPAs or 
a state-funded Transit Excellence Center (TEC) 
We recommend the state create a program for transit agencies to receive technical 
assistance either through RTPAs or through an independent, state-funded Transit 
Excellence Center, which could be composed of both peer and academic experts from 
around the state. Centralized, permanent sources of expertise would enable transit 
agency managers to receive consulting-type service when needed to help them 
improve their agency’s performance. By establishing this channel for technical 
assistance, the state would capitalize on existing (but decentralized) expertise at RTPAs 
and/or at the states’ transportation institutes.  
 
 
CURRENT TDA PROPOSED CHANGE ANTICIPATED EFFECT 
N/A ● Establish technical 
resources at either 
RTPA or at new, 
state Transit 
Excellence Center 
● Improved average 
statewide transit 
performance 
 
 
 
Recommendation #6: Establish framework and authority for 
remedial action, including agency restructuring  
If annual audits and multiple consultations with the RTPAs and TECs do not bring an 
agency into compliance after a predetermined time, agency-level action may be 
warranted. We recommend that the state establish a framework for agency 
reorganization and/or restructuring, and that the state delegate sufficient authority to 
presiding MPOs to oversee and, if necessary, organize the agency’s restructuring. The 
framework and established process would allow transitions in service to occur with 
greater consideration to riders’ needs. 
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CURRENT TDA PROPOSED CHANGE ANTICIPATED EFFECT 
N/A ● Add framework for 
agency 
reorganization 
and/or restructuring; 
give MPOs authority 
to oversee process 
● Improved statewide 
average transit 
performance 
 
 
 
We list a summary of proposed changes in Table 8.2 below. 
 
Table 8.2  Summary of Proposed Changes 
 CURRENT TDA PROPOSED CHANGES 
PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES USED 
Farebox recovery rate (LTF and 
STA);  
CPI cost escalation cap (STA) 
Multiple cost-efficiency, 
service-efficiency, and cost-
effectiveness measures 
COMPLIANCE 
DETERMINATION 
“Threshold” requirements: 
agencies are in compliance or 
not 
Standard deviation from the 
peer group mean; agencies 
below one standard deviation 
are out of compliance 
PEER GROUP 
DETERMINATION 
None (except for urban, non-
urban differences in threshold 
requirements) 
Peer groups determined by 
performance and system 
characteristics 
CONSEQUENCES 
FOR NON- 
COMPLIANCE 
Financial penalties Required consultation with 
RTPA or state-funded center for 
technical assistance; persistent 
non-compliance leads to 
restructuring evaluation by 
MPO 
AUDITS Annual and triennial; 
compliance-based 
Audit frequency varies based 
on compliance; audits focus on 
need for technical assistance 
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Appendix A:  
Detailed Summaries of State Findings 
 
Connecticut 
The state appears to track performance measures quarterly as a matter of practice, 
rather than by legislative requirement. Performance measures do not appear to be tied 
to funding allocations. 
 
The performance measure that the state Department of Transportation (CTDOT) tracks 
and reports for bus systems is reliability (average miles between road calls). For rail, 
the quarterly data include metrics of reliability (mean distance between failures), on-
time performance, and ridership.   
 
A “Public Transportation Biennial Report,” a collection of statewide bus and rail 
statistics was last compiled for the 2002/2003 fiscal year. 
 
 
Florida 
The State Transportation Trust Fund (STTF) is primarily derived from fuel taxes, motor 
vehicle/rental car sales taxes/surcharges, and motor vehicle title and registration fees, 
and serves as the source of state funding for public transportation. Section 206.46(3), 
F.S., requires, in each fiscal year, a minimum of 15 percent of all state revenues 
deposited into the STTF to be committed annually by FDOT for public transportation 
projects (aviation, transit, rail, intermodal and seaports).26 According to the National 
Transit Database, state funding provided 15% ($229M) of statewide transit operating 
expenditures in 2017. 
 
Florida’s Transportation Disadvantaged Trust Fund27 supports service for the elderly, 
disabled, and low-income populations served by all operators. The fund is 
administered by the Commission for the Transportation Disadvantaged (CTD) and 
distributed to county/regional Community Transportation Coordinators (CTCs) and 
approved operators. Under Florida state legislation, the CTD is charged with 
 
26 Florida Transit Systems Overview and Funding (Rep.). (2011, August). Retrieved 2019, from The Florida Senate, 
Committee on Transportation website: 
https://www.flsenate.gov/PublishedContent/Session/2012/InterimReports/2012%224.pdf   
27 2018 Annual Performance Report (Rep.). (2019, January 1). Retrieved 2019, from Florida Commission for the 
Transportation Disadvantaged website: https://ctd.fdot.gov/docs/AORAPRDocs/ApprovedAOR2017-2018.pdf  
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conducting cost comparisons and evaluating cost efficiency relative to the cost of 
transporting the general public. Operators are required to maintain service levels year-
over-year and to report efficiency metrics in support of discussions regarding 
efficiencies that a provider might adopt to reduce costs. These efficiency metrics do 
not feed into formula allocations; rather, each operator is required to report efficiency 
metrics on an annual basis to demonstrate proper use of funds.28 
 
Regarding allocation, each applicant/operator receives a minimum base allocation 
based on funding levels during CTD’s 1999-2000 Fiscal Year. Additional funds above 
the base amount is allocated based on a comparative ranking of all eligible applicants 
in each of the following four categories: 
● The applicant’s total county area in square miles as a percentage of the total 
square miles of all eligible applicants (25%) 
● Total system passenger trips provided as a percentage of all eligible applicant 
trips reported (25%) 
● Total system vehicle miles traveled as a percentage of all eligible applicants' 
vehicle miles traveled and reported (25%) 
● Total county population as a percentage of the total population of all eligible 
applicants (25%).29 
 
Performance measures are required to be reported annually; these include:  Operating 
Expense Per Total Passenger Trip, Operating Expense Per Paratransit Passenger Trip, 
Operating Expense Per Vehicle Mile, Operating Expense Per Driver Hour, Local Funding 
of System, Potential Transit Disadvantaged Population Served, Average Trips Per Driver 
Hour, Average Trips Per Paratransit Passenger, Accidents Per 100,000 Miles, Miles 
Between Roadcalls (Reliability). These reported performance measures are not tied to 
specific targets or funding allocations. 
 
Performance Measures 
Florida DOT has a triennial review process, but does not stipulate specific performance 
metrics or targets, instead encouraging continuous improvement and highlights areas 
of concern for each audit. Florida requires that grant recipients for all programs report 
passenger trips, revenue miles, total operating expense, operating revenue, vehicles 
operated in maximum service, base fare, revenue miles between system failures, 
 
28 Melendez, E. (2019, April 24). Conversation re: CTD transit funding [Telephone interview]. Florida Commission for 
the Transportation Disadvantaged 
29 Grants Program, § 41-2.014 (2004). State of Florida Administrative Code 
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days/hours service is available, and operating expense per passenger trip, annually 
within local newspapers.30,31 
 
 
Illinois 
According to the National Transit Database, state funding provided 15.3% ($428M) of 
statewide transit operating expenditures in 2017. 
 
The Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) is charged with financial oversight, 
funding, and regional transit planning for Northeast Illinois’ transit operators or Service 
Boards: the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), Metra and Pace Suburban Bus and Pace 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Paratransit. Illinois law authorizes the RTA to 
impose a sales tax throughout the six-county Northeastern Illinois region. The RTA 
sales tax is collected by the Illinois Department of Revenue and paid to the Treasurer 
of the State of Illinois to be held in trust for the RTA outside of the State treasury. 
Proceeds from the RTA sales tax are paid directly to the RTA monthly. 
 
The sales tax rates imposed by the RTA differ in order to recognize the differing levels 
of transit service provided in the six-county region. In Cook County the RTA imposes a 
1.25% sales tax whereas in DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, and Will Counties the rate is 
.50%. The State fiscal year 2018 budget included a permanent 2% surcharge that will 
be retained by the State before the RTA sales tax is disbursed to the RTA, reducing RTA 
sales tax receipts by ~$24M annually. 
 
The RTA evaluates transit performance relative to national peers, both by operators 
and by mode, using the Federal Transit Administration’s National Transit Database 
(NTD). These comparisons are not tied to funding levels. Key performance metrics are 
related to service coverage (vehicle revenue miles and unlinked passenger trips), 
service efficacy and effectiveness (operating costs per vehicle miles and trips), service 
maintenance (miles between major mechanical failures), and service level solvency 
(fare revenues per trip, farebox recovery ratios).32 These comparisons are purely for 
comparison and auditing purposes, they are not used for funding allocation, nor does 
the RTA set goals for these metrics.  
 
 
30 State Management Plan (Rep.). (2016) Retrieved 2019, from Florida Dept. of Transportation website: 
https://fdotwww.blob.core.windows.net/sitefinity/docs/default-
source/content/transit/pages/statemanagementplan20160208.pdf 
31 Triennial Review (Rep.). (2015) Retrieved 2019, from Florida Dept. of Transportation website: 
https://fdotwww.blob.core.windows.net/sitefinity/docs/default-
source/content/transit/pages/5307trpg20150810.pdf?sfvrsn=ab77d601_0  
32 Peer Performance Reports, RTA Chicago. (n.d.). Retrieved 2019, from https://www.rtachicago.org/plans-
programs/performance-measures/peer-performance-reports  
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The RTA is required to develop a Strategic Plan every five years to define goals and 
objectives related to “the adequacy, efficiency, geographic equity and coordination” of 
public transportation in the state. Per Illinois state legislation, the Strategic Plan must 
establish performance standards and measurements regarding travel times and on-
time performance, ridership, equipment failure rates, employee and customer safety, 
and customer satisfaction.33  
 
Public Transportation Fund 
Illinois law provides that the State Treasurer is authorized and required to transfer from 
the State of Illinois’ General Revenue Fund to the Public Transportation Fund an amount 
equal to 30% of the revenue realized from the RTA Sales Tax and 30% of the revenue 
realized from the Chicago Transit Authority’s portion of the Real Estate Transfer Tax 
(RETT) in the City of Chicago. Consequently, the state money dedicated to public 
transportation increases or decreases at a rate equal to the growth or decline of both 
the sales tax and the RETT. The RTA expects to receive approximately $400 million 
from the State Public Transportation Fund in 2017. 
 
Illinois distributes the fund to service boards (Board of the Commuter Rail Division of 
the Authority, the Board of the Suburban Bus Division of the Authority and the Board of 
the Chicago Transit Authority) using specified allocation percentages of sales tax 
revenue from each individual county, per Sec. 4.03.3. of 70 ILCS 3615.34 
 
Downstate Operating Assistance Program (DOAP)35 
The Downstate Operating Assistance Program (DOAP) provides funding to public 
transit providers within local governments or mass transit districts (MTDs) outside 
Northeast Illinois to support operating, capital, and administrative costs of public 
transit systems in urbanized and rural regions. These funds are based on 7.5%9 of the 
sales tax generated in the service area and are allocated to the local government or 
MTD through the state’s General Revenue Fund. Each transit agency’s DOAP 
appropriation is required by law to increase by 10% each year. 
 
Currently, DOAP pays up to 65% of eligible expenses and each eligible participant 
receives an annual appropriation from the general assembly. For applicants, Illinois 
evaluates operating deficits, defined as the amount by which eligible operating 
expenses exceed revenues from non-reimbursable fares, rental of properties, 
advertising, and any other amounts collected or received in the process of providing 
 
33 Regional Transportation Authority Act, § 70-3615 (Illinois General Assembly 2005). 
34 Regional Transportation Authority Act, § 70-3615 (Illinois General Assembly 2005). 
35 Operating Revenue and Funding, RTA Chicago. (n.d.). Retrieved 2019, from https://rtachicago.org/finance-
management/operating-revenue-and-funding  
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public transportation.36 DOAP requires quarterly reports to be submitted in order to 
review operating deficits and operating expenses and makes an eligibility  
determination based on whether deficits and expenditures conform to program 
expectations. Transit agencies seeking DOAP funds must submit forms detailing fare 
revenues, ridership numbers, revenue vehicle miles, and revenue vehicle hours as part 
of their application.37  
 
  
 
36 By law this is equal to 80% of 3/32 of the net revenue realized from the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act, the Service 
Occupation Tax Act, the Use Tax Act, and the Service Use Tax Act. Downstate Public Transportation Act, § 30-740 
(Illinois General Assembly 2005). 
37 Batty, S. (n.d.). Public Transportation Providers, IDOT Illinois. Retrieved 2019, from 
http://idot.illinois.gov/transportation-system/local-transportation-partners/public-transportation-providers/ 
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Figure A.1  Illinois’ Motor Fuel Tax Fund distribution38  
 
Maryland 
The Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) is a division of the Maryland Department of 
Transportation. MTA operates the Baltimore region’s transit systems as well as MARC 
commuter trains and commuter buses.39 The MTA also provides funding and 
assistance to Locally Operated Transit Systems (LOTS) throughout the state. According 
to the National Transit Database, state funding provided 61.1% ($560M) of statewide 
transit operating expenditures in 2017. 
 
 
Figure A.2  Maryland Transportation Agency organization40 
 
 
 
 
38 Motor Fuel Tax Funds Source, Distribution and Uses for County (Rep.). (2017). Retrieved 2019, from Illinois Dept. 
of Transportation website: http://www.idot.illinois.gov/Assets/uploads/files/Doing-Business/Manuals-Guides-&-
Handbooks/Highways/Local-Roads-and-
Streets/MFT/Motor%Fuel%Tax%Funds%Source,%Distribution%and%Uses%for%County.pdf 
39 The state also funds Maryland’s share of funding for the Washington Area Metropolitan Transit Authority. A 
summary of this funding has been omitted since the system is managed jointly by Maryland, Virginia, and 
Washington, DC. Maryland’s share is by appropriation. HB 372, passed in 2018, fixed Maryland’s appropriation at 
$167 million annually. 
40 Maryland Department of Transportation, 2040 Maryland Transportation Plan (2018).  Available at 
http://www.mdot.maryland.gov/newMDOT/Santoria/2040MTP_Draft_Plan_September_2018.pdf. 
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State Funding Sources 
The Maryland DOT, including the MTA, is funded by the Transportation Trust Fund 
(TTF) established in 1971. The TTF funds all MDOT activities, including debt service, 
maintenance, operations, administration, and capital projects.41 TTF is funded by 
transportation related revenues including motor fuel taxes, vehicle excise (titling) 
taxes, motor vehicle fees (registrations, licenses and other fees), operating revenues 
(e.g., transit fares, port fees, airport fees) and federal-aid. In addition, small 
percentages of revenues from corporate income taxes and state sales taxes.42 
 
Repeal of Farebox Recovery 
Before 2017, MTA was required to recover at least 35% of its total operating costs from 
fares and other operating revenue,43 while not reducing the level of services.44 Since 
2009, MTA had a rate of 28% and was struggling to provide service.45  HB 271 (2017) 
repealed farebox recovery as a basis for allocation of state funding for transit.46    
 
An early draft of HB 271 included five additional performance measures which were 
not supported by MTA and were ultimately not passed into law.47 These included: 
● Reliability: measured by on–time performance for each mode of transit service 
● Speed: measured by average trip travel times for each mode of transit service 
● Usage: measured by the number of passengers for each mode of transit service  
● Access: measured by the proportion of jobs located in the core service area that 
are accessible within a 45–minute transit commute for the average resident of 
the core service area. and  
 
41 MD Transportation Code § 3-216 (2014) 
42 Maryland Department of Transportation. (2013). Transportation Trust Fund. Retrieved from 
http://www.mdot.maryland.gov/newMDOT/Finance/TransportationFund.html. 
43 Transportation Article, § 7-208(b)(2)) (2016). Department of Legislative Services, Maryland General Assembly, 
FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE House Bill 271. (2017). Available at 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2017RS/fnotes/bil_0001/hb0271.pdf. 
44 Chapter 397, Acts of 20 11 (HB 72). Retrieved from 
http://dlslibrary.state.md.us/publications/Exec/MDOT/MTA/TR7-208(b)_2015.pdf.  
45 O’Malley, Brian. (2017, March 15). How Maryland Handcuffs its Transit System and How that Could Change.  
Greater Greater Washington. March 15, 2017. Retrieved from https://ggwash.org/view/62712/how-maryland-
handcuffs-its-transit-system-and-how-that-could-change. 
46 Maryland Open Transportation Investment Decision Act of 2016 HB1013, 2016 Md. Laws, Chap. 36 [House Bill 
1013]). Department of Legislative Services, Maryland General Assembly, FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE House Bill 271. 
(2017).  Note that fare increases indexed to CPI are still required every five years. Article II, Section 17(b) of the 
Maryland Constitution - Chapter 24 (b-1).  Retrieved from https://codes.findlaw.com/md/transportation/md-code-
transp-sect-7-208.html, http://dlslibrary.state.md.us/publications/Exec/MDOT/MTA/TR7-208(b)_2015.pdf.  
47 House Bill 271. (2017). Retrieved  http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2017RS/fnotes/bil_0001/hb0271.pdf. Shaver, 
Katherine. (2017, February 22). Should Maryland transit systems be required to cover a share of their operating costs 
with fares? Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-
gridlock/wp/2017/02/22/should-maryland-transit-systems-be-required-to-cover-a-share-of-their-operating-
costs-through-fares/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2261e6053510. 
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● Frequency: measured by the percent of the total population in the core service 
area that lives within one–half mile of full–day high–frequency transit for which 
average headways are 15 minutes or less.  
 
Maryland Transportation law stipulates that MTA track specific performance indicators 
but does not link those to funding. Sec 7-208 specifies that “the Administration shall 
implement performance indicators to track service efficiency for the Administration's 
mass transit services, including: (i) Operating expenses per revenue vehicle mile; (ii) 
Operating expenses per passenger trip; (iii) Passenger trips per revenue vehicle mile.”48 
 
MTA is also required to compare its yearly performance on these measures to similar 
“peer” systems nationwide. These performance measures are reported in testimony 
submitted to the Maryland Department of Budget and Management in response to a 
yearly budget analysis performed by the Maryland Department of Legislative 
Services.49  
Funding for transit operations 
Funding for transit operations is subject to legislative discretion,50 and state 
transportation law does not specify an allocation procedure.51  MTA operations in the 
Baltimore-Washington metropolitan area include more than 50 local bus lines in 
Baltimore, and other services such as the light rail, metro subway, commuter buses, 
Maryland Area Regional Commuter (MARC) trains, and mobility/paratransit vehicles.52 
MTA is frequently funded through discretionary line-items in the state budget and has 
no dedicated funding stream.53  
 
Local operated transit systems (LOTS) 
Local Operating Transit Systems (LOTS) operate in all 23 Baltimore counties, ranging 
from extensive fixed-route service to specialized paratransit services. The Office of 
Local Transit Support (OLTS) provides a variety of technical assistance services to the 
LOTS. LOTS are eligible to receive state funding from: 
 
48 Md. Code Ann., Transportation § 7-208. MDOT Maryland Transit Administration, Operating Budget Analysis 
2018FY. Retrieved from http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/pubs/budgetfiscal/2018fy-budget-docs-operating-j00h01-
mdot-maryland-transit-administration.pdf. 
49 Maryland Department of Budget and Management. FY 2020 Responses to DLS Operating Budget Analysis and 
Testimony. Available at https://dbm.maryland.gov/budget/Pages/operbudget/HearingTestimony.aspx. (See 
documents beginning with J00).   
50 Maryland Transportation Code § 3-216 (d)(2) (2013).  
51 Maryland Transportation Code available at https://law.justia.com/codes/maryland/2017/transportation/ 
52 Department of Legislative Services, Maryland General Assembly, FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE House Bill 271. 
(2017). Available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2017RS/fnotes/bil_0001/hb0271.pdf. 
53 Dresser, Michael. (2018, April 5). Maryland legislature gives final OK to bill that would increase MTA funding, The 
Baltimore Sun. Retrieved from https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-mta-funding-
20180402-story.html 
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● State Transit Operating and Capital Matching Funds: State matching funds 
dictated by federal funding programs. 
 
● State Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Funding Program: Operations 
funding allocated by need. 
 
● Statewide Special Transportation Assistance Program (SSTAP): SSTAP is a 
State-funded program to provide general purpose transportation to elderly 
individuals and individuals with disabilities. These funds are annually 
apportioned to the counties and Baltimore City based on a formula (60 percent 
equally among the jurisdictions and 40 percent based on combined population 
of elderly individuals and individuals with disabilities). Funds can be used for 
operating and capital with a local share required – minimum 25 percent for the 
net operating deficit and five percent for capital projects. Each County and the 
City of Baltimore is eligible to apply for the SSTAP funds. 
 
● State Large Urban Program: Grant program offers state funds for operating and 
capital assistance in large urban areas. In FY 2018, the City of Annapolis, Anne 
Arundel County, Cecil County, Howard County, Montgomery County, Prince 
George's County, and Queen Anne’s County were eligible to receive these 
funds.54 
 
In addition, MTA instituted the Statewide Transit Innovation Grants (STIG) program in 
2018, distributing $515,377 for innovative projects including capital and operations.55  
 
Table A.1  Summary of Maryland LOTS funding programs 
FUND PURPOSE METHOD DESCRIPTION 
 State Transit 
Operating and 
Capital Matching 
Funds 
Capital and 
Operations 
Federal Formula State matching 
funds for federal 
transit grant 
programs 
State Americans 
with Disabilities 
Operations By Need Operations 
funding to 
comply with 
 
54 Maryland Transit Administration. (2017).  Locally Operated Transit Systems (LOTS) Program Manual. Retrieved 
from https://s3.amazonaws.com/mta-website-staging/mta-website-
staging/files/Regional+Transit/2017_LOTS_Manual.pdf. 
55 Mass Transit Magazine, “MDOT MTA Awards Over $500,000 for Innovative Public Transportation Projects in 
Maryland, “September 14, 2018. Available at https://www.masstransitmag.com/technology/fare-collection/press-
release/12429890/maryland-transit-administration-mta-mdot-mta-awards-over-500000-for-innovative-public-
transportation-projects-in-maryland. 
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Act (ADA) 
Funding Program 
ADA  
Statewide 
Special 
Transportation 
Assistance 
Program (SSTAP) 
Capital and 
Operations 
State Formula To meet the 
needs of elderly 
and disabled 
transit users 
State Large 
Urban Program 
Capital and 
Operations 
Grant Supplemental 
funding for 
larger systems 
 
Maryland does track performance indicators for LOTS operations and publishes targets 
for different classification of transit systems. LOTS are required to submit financial and 
operating data to their MTA Regional Planner on a quarterly basis. LOTS are classified 
as Small Urban, Large Urban or Rural.56  The performance indicators listed below are 
collected for all LOTS, but the performance requirement levels differ by classification:  
● Operating Cost per Hour  
● Operating Cost per Mile  
● Operating Cost per Passenger Trip  
● Local Operating Revenue Ratio  
● Farebox Recovery Ratio57 
● Passenger Trips per Mile  
● Passenger Trips per Hour58 
 
These performance indicators are not explicitly linked to funding allocation but may be 
reviewed for grant funding applications. The LOTS manual lists the following objectives 
of the performance monitoring  program: i) to ensure that resources are being used 
wisely, so that services are operated efficiently, ii) to meet reporting requirements 
established through federal and state mandates; iii) to identify how well services are 
being provided to transit riders; and iv) to obtain accurate information about services 
to support actions designed to improve performance.59  
 
56 Maryland Transit Administration. (2017).  Locally Operated Transit Systems (LOTS) Program Manual. (Page 55). 
Retrieved from https://s3.amazonaws.com/mta-website-staging/mta-website-
staging/files/Regional+Transit/2017_LOTS_Manual.pdf.  
57 This manual was published before the farebox recovery repeal, but it is the most recent.  They could still be 
tracking this but not basing funding on it.  
58Maryland Transit Administration. (2017).  Locally Operated Transit Systems (LOTS) Program Manual. Attachment 
3-F.  Retrieved from https://s3.amazonaws.com/mta-website-staging/mta-website-
staging/files/Regional+Transit/2017_LOTS_Manual.pdf.  
59 Maryland Transit Administration. (2017).  Locally Operated Transit Systems (LOTS) Program Manual. Page 3-16.  
Retrieved from https://s3.amazonaws.com/mta-website-staging/mta-website-
staging/files/Regional+Transit/2017_LOTS_Manual.pdf.  
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Massachusetts 
The state provides funding to all transit agencies, but laws governing the funding of the 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) are distinct from those affecting 
the other 15 Regional Transit Authorities. In 2009, “An Act Modernizing the 
Transportation Systems of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts” (Chapter 25 of the 
Acts of 2009), commonly referred to as the Transportation Reform Act), consolidated 
all transportation services in Massachusetts under the Massachusetts State 
Department of Transportation (MassDOT).  
 
MassDOT currently oversees and supports nearly 10,000 lane miles of roadway, over 
5,000 bridges, and 36 airports. The MBTA, governed by MassDOT,60 is the nation’s 
fifth largest transit system, with 2,500 buses and trains carrying 1.3 million passenger 
trips per-day across 175 communities. Massachusetts’ 15 Regional Transit Authorities 
operate an additional 1,400 vehicles across 231 communities.61 According to the 
National Transit Database, state funding provided 50.5% ($1,093M) of statewide transit 
operating expenditures in 2017. 
 
Transit funding 
The Act reconstituted the Highway Find and created two separate state funds used for 
transit in Massachusetts: the Commonwealth Transportation Fund (CTF)62 and the 
Massachusetts Transportation Trust Fund (MTTF). The CTF uses gas taxes and registry 
fees to pay debt service, and transfers remaining revenues to the MTTF. The CTF is 
subject to annual appropriation by the legislature.63 The MTTF is administered by 
MassDOT and is not subject to legislative appropriation.64 The MTTF is funded by 
transportation system revenues, the majority of which is raised through bridge and 
turnpike tolls.65 
 
In 2013, An Act Relative to Transportation Finance (Bill H.3535) raised additional annual 
resources for transportation.66 The legislation included an estimated $519 million per 
year in new taxes, of which $390 million per year is dedicated to transportation. These 
 
60 Mass. Gen. L. c. 6c, §53. 
61 Massachusetts Budget and Policy Center. (2017). What Does Massachusetts Transportation Funding Support and 
What Are the Revenue Sources. Retrieved from 
http://www.massbudget.org/report_window.php?loc=What-Does-MA-Transportation-Funding-Support.html. 
62 Mass. Gen. L. c. 6c, §4.  
63 Mass. Gen. L. c. 29, §2ZZZ. 
64Massachusetts Budget and Policy Center. (2017). What Does Massachusetts Transportation Funding Support and 
What Are the Revenue Sources. Retrieved from 
http://www.massbudget.org/report_window.php?loc=What-Does-MA-Transportation-Funding-Support.html. 
65 Mass. Gen. L. c. 6c, §4.  
66 2013 Mass. Acts. 3535.  
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resources included increasing the motor fuels tax by three cents and indexing it to the 
rate of inflation, planned MBTA fare increases, dedicating motor sales tax collection to 
transportation, and reinstituting tolling on the western exits of the Massachusetts 
Turnpike.67 Sec. 6a of the law also specified goals for transit performance: 
 
 ...(8) for the Mass Transit division, an increase in the farebox recovery ratio of 
at least 10 per cent for each transit authority for each rolling 5-year period; (9) 
for the Mass Transit division, an increase in the on-time performance 
percentage for 53 each transit authority of at least 2 per cent for each rolling 
5-year period, until that percentage reaches 98 per cent; and (10) for the Mass 
Transit division, an increase of at least 5 per cent in the revenue miles per 
active vehicle reported to the Federal Transit Administration for each transit 
authority for each rolling 5-year period. 
 
  
 
67 Transportation for Massachusetts. (2014). Keeping Track. Report. Received from http://www.clf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/FRG-MAP-TranspReport-Feb14-1.7-web.pdf.  
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Figure A.3  Maryland state funding for transportation68 
 
 
  
 
68 Massachusetts Budget and Policy Center. (2017).  What Does Massachusetts Transportation Funding Support 
and What Are the Revenue Sources. 
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Funding Allocation 
 
MBTA 
Since 2000, the bulk of state assistance for MBTA transit operations come from 1% 
state sales tax revenues dedicated to MBTA operations.69 By statute, MBTA also 
receives a baseline of $160,000,0000 annually from the Commonwealth 
Transportation Trust Fund, which can be augmented by line-item appropriation.70   
 
Regional Transportation Authorities 
 
 
Figure A.4  Massachusetts’ Regional Transit Authorities71 
 
By statute, RTAs receive a baseline of $15,000,0000 annually from the CTTF.72 State 
assistance in 2017 was over $82 million, accounting for 39% of RTA operating revenue.  
 
 
69 Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. (2018).  Financial Statements. Retrieved from 
https://cdn.mbta.com/sites/default/files/financials/audited-financials/fy2018-audited-financials.pdf. 
70 Mass. Gen. L. c. 29, §2ZZZ.  
71 Massachusetts Department of Transportation. (2018). Regional Transit Authorities: New Metrics and Funding 
Provisions in FI19 Budget. Regional Transit Authorities: New Metrics and Funding Provisions in FI19 Budget. Retrieved 
from https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/09/18/RTA_Taskforce_091718.pdf 
72 Mass. Gen. L. c. 29, §2ZZZ.  
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Massachusetts must use State Contract Assistance (SCA) to fund at least 50% of the 
RTAs’ Net Cost of Service. SCA distribution is currently based on historical funding 
levels at the time of the Transportation Reform Act.  Other sources of RTA funding 
include FTA funding, local assessments and fare revenues. In total, RTAs receive 37% of 
their funding through State Contract Assistance, ranging from a low of 25% and a high 
of 47% depending on the system. In 2018 MassDOT assembled a task force to explore 
how to incorporate performance metrics into RTA funding. Beginning in 2019, they plan 
to supplement existing formula allocation with $4 million in discretionary grants to 
agencies that encourage data-driven decision making.73   
 
 
 
Figure A.5  Massachusetts Transportation Funding Flow Chart, FY 
1574 
 
 
Performance measures not linked to revenue 
The 2009 Transportation Reform Act required MassDOT to submit a yearly 
Performance Management Report to the state legislature. The report includes 
numerous performance measures assessing the MBTA and the 15 RTAs and includes 
targets for some metrics. These performance measures are not linked to yearly funding 
 
73 Massachusetts Department of Transportation. (2018, September). Regional Transit Authorities: New Metrics and 
Funding Provisions in FY19 Budget. Presentation.  Retrieved from 
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/09/18/RTA_Taskforce_091718.pdf.  
74 Baxandall, P. (2017, January 17). What Does Massachusetts Transportation Funding Support and What Are the 
Revenue Sources. Retrieved from http://www.massbudget.org/report_window.php?loc=What-Does-MA-
Transportation-Funding-Support.html 
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allocation.75 Since 2016, a selection of these performance metrics is presented on a 
regularly updated “dashboard.”76 
 
Selected performance measures for RTAs include number of scheduled trips, operating 
expense per vehicle revenue mile, safety indicators, farebox recovery ratio, annual 
ridership, and percentage of Massachusetts residents with access to fixed route 
transit.77   
 
Selected performance measures for MBTA include: service reliability and passenger 
travel time, fare recovery ratio, safety recovery indicators, percentage of residents 
within one half mile of transit, and unlinked passenger trips.78 
 
 
Michigan 
Michigan statutes guarantee funding for transit based on allocations untethered to 
performance measurements. The state’s “Local Bus Capital and Operating Assistance 
Programs” guarantee operating funding: “Nonurbanized areas and urbanized areas 
under 100,000 population will receive state operating assistance for up to 60 percent 
of eligible expenses. Urbanized areas over 100,000 population will receive state 
operating assistance for up to 50 percent of eligible expenses.”79  The program also 
seeks to provide a state share to match federal Section 5307, 5339, Small Urban, 
5311(f), STP, and CMAQ funds. 
 
Local agencies submit annual local transportation programs to the state transportation 
department (MDOT); these programs describe planned service for the following fiscal 
year. The information agencies must submit is: “contemplated routes, hours of service, 
estimated transit vehicle miles, costs of public transportation services, and projected 
capital improvements or projects.”80  MDOT evaluates and approves each agency’s 
annual public transportation program. 
 
 
75 Massachusetts Department of Transportation. (2017, Nov.). MassDOT’s Annual Performance Report. P. 42-43. 
Retrieved from  https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/04/20/Tracker2017.pdf. 
76 MBTA Dashboard. (2019). Available at http://mbtabackontrack.com/performance/index.html#/home. 
77 Massachusetts Department of Transportation. (2017, Nov.). MassDOT’s Annual Performance Report. P. 42-43. 
Retrieved from  https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/04/20/Tracker2017.pdf. 
78 Massachusetts Department of Transportation. (2017, Nov.). MassDOT’s Annual Performance Report. P. 42-43. 
Retrieved from  https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/04/20/Tracker2017.pdf. 
79 Michigan Department of Transportation. (n.d.). Local Bus Capital and Operating Assistance Programs. Retrieved 
from https://www.michigan.gov/mdot/0,4616,7-151-11056_11266-26940--,00.html 
80 Michigan Department of Transportation. (1997). A Reprint of Act 51 Public Acts 1951 As Amended. A Reprint of Act 
51 Public Acts 1951 As Amended. Retrieved from https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ctfact51_18079_7.pdf 
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MDOT encourages agencies to conform to federal transportation improvement 
program standards in developing their programs.  
 
A prescribed formula determines how the state DOT funds transit. State law authorizes 
the department to pay “100% of the portion of the cost not eligible for reimbursement 
by the federal government for eligible capital projects authorized by the state 
transportation commission…”   
 
Funding for local bus service is similarly prescribed: new approved local bus services 
“not in their fourth year” are funded “in the following percentages of eligible operating 
expenses as determined by the department:  
a) Startup 100% 
b) First year 90% 
c) Second year 80% 
d) Third year 70% 
e) Fourth year and each year thereafter, as determined by and from funds 
provided under subsection (4) (a).” 
 
Local bus capital funds are also stipulated in state law as being “not less than 
$8,000,000…”  
 
In addition a “Local Bus Capital and Operating Assistance” program provides state 
operating assistance of up to 60% of expenses for nonurbanized areas and urbanized 
areas with populations of under 100,000, and up to 50% of operating expenses for 
urbanized areas with  populations greater than 100,000. 
 
 
Minnesota 
State law requires the commissioner of the state department of transportation to 
submit to the legislature an annual report on transit services “outside the metropolitan 
area;” the commissioner’s report must provide a “descriptive overview” of transit in the 
state and a “descriptive summary” of funding sources and assistance programs, as well 
as a summary of each public transit system receiving state funding.  Financial and 
performance data included in the report are:  
● Operating and capital costs 
● Funding sources 
● Amount of federal funds from each federal program. 
 
In addition, the commissioner must report a “summary of differences in program 
implementation requirements and aid recipient eligibility between federal aid and state 
sources of funds.” 
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In each odd-numbered year, the commissioner must also provide an “analysis of 
public transit system needs and operating expenditures on an annual basis” with a 
five-year forecast, taking into account local sources of revenue. The state law also 
requires a “comprehensive transit assistance percentage for each transit system 
classification,” a ratio of expenditures to subsidy. The commissioner also reports “the 
amount of surplus or insufficient funds available” for fully implementing “the greater 
Minnesota transit investment plan.” 
  
 
New York 
The New York State Department of Transportation distributes about $3.0 billion 
annually to approximately 130 transit operators.81 As of 2017, state transit aid accounts 
for approximately one-third of the operating resources used to support the state’s 
transit systems.82 New York has two dedicated transit funding programs: the State 
Dedicated Fund (SDF) provides funding for capital projects and the Statewide Mass 
Transportation Operating Assistance (STOA) provides funding for transit agency 
operations. According to the National Transit Database, state funding provided 34.3% 
($5,042M) of statewide transit operating expenditures in 2017. 
 
Statewide Mass Transportation Operating Assistance (STOA) 
The STOA began in 1975 funded by appropriations from the State’s General Fund and 
administered by the Commissioner of Transportation (Sec. 18-b). STOA funds 
distributed pursuant to the original 18-b provisions of the State Transportation Law 
require a 100% local match.83 STOA consists of two distinct, dedicated funds: MTOA 
and DMTTF. 
 
Mass Transit Operating Assistance (MTOA) 
The Mass Transit Operating Assistance (MTOA), established in 1981, is funded by 
dedicated portions of multiple taxes.84 MTOA funds two distinct programs: 
“downstate” - the 12-county New York metropolitan transportation commuter district, 
and “upstate” (all other transit systems).  
 
 
81 Includes those not directly receiving federal funds. NY. SFL. Section 88-A. Retrieved from: 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/STF/88-A 
82 New York State FY 2018 Executive Budget. Retrieved from 
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy18archive/exec/fy1718littlebook/Transportation.pdf 
83 (n.d.). Section 88-A Mass transportation operating assistance fund. Section 88-A Mass transportation operating 
assistance fund. The New York State Senate. Retrieved from https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/STF/88-A 
84 American Public Transportation Association. (2010).  Survey of State Funding for Public Transportation. Retrieved 
from https://www.apta.com/resources/reportsandpublications/Documents/survey_state_funding_FY_08.pdf. 
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● The Metropolitan Mass Transportation Operating Assistance account funds New 
York City regional transit and select systems in the Capitol Corridor between 
NYC and the state capitol in Albany. Downstate transit systems are funded by a 
portion of the Petroleum Business Tax (PBT); the MTA Corporate Tax Surcharge; 
a 1/4 Percent Sales Tax in the MTA region; and the Transmission Tax.85 In 2018, 
MMTOA collected a total of $2.3 billion. The MTA received $1.7 billion, and other 
downstate operators received the balance.86 This funding is frequently 
supplemented with line-item funding in the state budget using general funds.87  
   
● The Public Transportation Systems Operating Assistance account funds upstate 
transit systems.88 The upstate systems receive a dedicated portion of the PBT 
only.89 
 
Dedicated Mass Transportation Trust Fund (DMTTF)90  
This DMTTF was created in 1993 and is funded by additional dedicated revenues from 
the Petroleum Business Tax. The Mass Transportation Trust Fund receives 37 percent 
and the remaining 63 percent goes to the Highway and Bridge Trust Fund. The Mass 
Transportation Trust Fund is further split 34 percent to the MTA and 3 percent to the 
non-MTA systems.91 The non-MTA funds can be used for operations or as the required 
match for federal capital funding.92  
 
 
85 New York Department of Transportation. (n.d.). State Transit Operating Assistance. Retrieved from 
https://www.dot.ny.gov/divisions/policy-and-strategy/public-transportation/funding-sources/STOA. 
86 Rivoli, Dan. (2018, May 25). MTA Budget: Where the money comes from. New York Daily News. 
http://interactive.nydailynews.com/project/mta-funding/#subsidies 
87 American Public Transportation Association. (2010).  Survey of State Funding for Public Transportation. Retrieved 
from https://www.apta.com/resources/reportsandpublications/Documents/survey_state_funding_FY_08.pdf.  
New York Department of Transportation. (n.d.)  Chapter II Transit Finance and Capital Assistance. Retrieved from 
https://www.dot.ny.gov/divisions/policy-and-strategy/public-trans-respository/chapter2_0.pdf. 
88 New York Department of Transportation. (n.d.)  Chapter II Transit Finance and Capital Assistance. Retrieved from 
https://www.dot.ny.gov/divisions/policy-and-strategy/public-trans-respository/chapter2_0.pdf. 
89New York Department of Transportation. (n.d.). State Transit Operating Assistance. Retrieved from 
https://www.dot.ny.gov/divisions/policy-and-strategy/public-transportation/funding-sources/STOA. 
90 NY. SFL. Section 89-c. 
91  New York Department of Transportation. (n.d.)  Chapter II Transit Finance and Capital Assistance. Retrieved from 
https://www.dot.ny.gov/divisions/policy-and-strategy/public-trans-respository/chapter2_0.pdf. 
92 New York Department of Transportation. (n.d.). Transit State Dedicated Fund (SDF) Program.  Available at 
https://www.dot.ny.gov/divisions/policy-and-strategy/public-transportation/funding-sources/SDF. 
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Figure A.6  New York’s Mass Transportation Operating Assistance 
Fund93 
  
Local Bus System Allocation from STOA 
Upstate bus systems receive STOA through an incentive based passenger and vehicle 
mile formula.94 Under 18-b of the New York Transportation Law, “the Commissioner [of 
Transportation] may develop a single formula to distribute mass transportation 
operating assistance payments authorized by separate appropriations in order to 
facilitate program administration and to ensure an orderly distribution of such funds.” 
This is specified as the “combined service and usage distribution formula.”95 The 
current formula is $.405 per passenger, $.69 per revenue vehicle mile for both upstate 
and downstate systems.96,97   
 
 
93 New York Department of Transportation. Chapter II Transit Finance and Capital Assistance. (n.d.) 
94 American Public Transportation Association, Survey of State Funding for Public Transportation, (2010). Available 
at https://www.apta.com/resources/reportsandpublications/Documents/survey_state_funding_FY_08.pdf.  The 
only bus systems that are not “upstate systems” are Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA); New York City 
Department of Transportation - Staten Island Ferry (SIF); New York City Department of Transportation - Private 
Franchised operators; Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (NFTA); Rochester-Genesee Regional 
Transportation Authority (RGRTA); Capital District Transportation Authority (CDTA); Central New York Regional 
Transportation Authority (CNYRTA); Westchester County Bee-Line; Nassau County - Long Island Bus; and Suffolk 
County - Suffolk County Transit.  
95 17 CRR NY 975.12.  Available at  https://www.dot.ny.gov/divisions/policy-and-strategy/public-trans-
respository/stoarr.pdf. 
96 Transportation Law, § 18-b. 
97 New York Department of Transportation. (n.d.)  Chapter II Transit Finance and Capital Assistance. Retrieved from 
https://www.dot.ny.gov/divisions/policy-and-strategy/public-trans-respository/chapter2_0.pdf. 
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Performance Metrics Not Linked to Funding Allocation 
The New York State Department of Transportation is required to annually report on the 
efficiency, effectiveness and economy of transit service. Performance reports are 
public and are submitted to the Senate Finance Committee and the chairman of the 
Assembly Ways and Means Committee, and to the Director of the Budget.98 State law 
provides the following example of qualified indicators:  
 
"Economy, efficiency and effectiveness indicators" shall refer to a series of 
criteria established by the Department to measure the performance of transit 
operations in terms of their operating and capital cost input, as compared to 
their service quantity, quality and usage output. Examples of indicators that 
may be used are: (1) revenue vehicle hours per employee hour; (2) revenue 
vehicle miles per employee hour; (3) operating cost per vehicle hour; (4) 
operating revenue compared to operating cost; (5) operating revenue plus 
voluntary local assistance per passenger mile; (6) revenue passengers per 
vehicle hour; (7) revenue passenger miles per vehicle hour; (8) revenue 
passenger miles per vehicle mile; (9) operating cost per revenue passenger 
mile; (10) operating loss per revenue passenger mile; (11) revenue passengers 
per employee hour; (12) revenue passenger miles per employee hour; and (13) 
percent on time performance.99 
 
NYDOT currently uses the following performance indicators to meet these 
requirements.  
● Effectiveness: revenue passenger to revenue vehicle mile ratio  
● Efficiency: operating cost per revenue vehicle mile ratio  
● Economy: operating revenue to operating cost ratio.100 
 
 
North Carolina 
As of 2017, North Carolina had 99 public transportation systems throughout the state 
that serve more than 70 million passengers. These systems ranged from large, urban 
systems to both public and private community transit services.101 According to the 
National Transit Database, state funding provided 11.4% ($48.7M) of statewide transit 
operating expenditures in 2017. 
 
98 Transportation Law, § 18-b. 17 CRR-NY 975.8. 
99 17 CRR-NY 975.4 (o) 
100 New York Department of Transportation, CHAPTER III STATUS AND PERFORMANCE OF MAJOR TRANSIT 
SYSTEMS (n.d.). Available at 
https://www.dot.ny.gov/divisions/policy-and-strategy/public-trans-respository/chapter3_0.pdf. 
101 North Carolina Department of Transportation. (2018). N.C. Public Transit Systems. Retrieved from 
https://www.ncdot.gov/divisions/public-transit/Pages/nc-transit-systems.aspx.  
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Figure A.7  Public Transportation Systems in North Carolina by 
Category102 
 
 
 
Revenue Sources 
In 2017, North Carolina invested $52.4 million in state operating funds, which helped 
bring in $287 million in federal and local funds for NCDOT funding. Motor fuel taxes 
provide 55% of NCDOT funding, DMV fees provide 25%, and a highway use tax on 
vehicle title transfers provides the remaining 20%.103 
Funding Allocation for Transit Operations 
State funding for transit operations in North Carolina are distributed through multiple 
grant programs.104  
 
102 (2018). Public Transportation Systems in North Carolina by Category. Public Transportation Systems in North 
Carolina by Category. North Carolina Department of Transportation. Retrieved from 
https://www.ncdot.gov/divisions/public-transit/Documents/NC_public_transit.pdf 
103 North Carolina Department of Transportation. (2018). Finance and Budget. Retrieved from 
https://www.ncdot.gov/about-us/how-we-operate/finance-budget/Pages/default.aspx. 
104 North Carolina Department of Transportation. (n.d.). Grants & Annual Reporting Forms. Retrieved from 
https://connect.ncdot.gov/business/transit/pages/transit-grants.aspx. 
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State Maintenance Assistance Program (SMAP) 
The State Maintenance Assistance Program (SMAP) provides funding for urban, 
regional and small urban areas to use as a match for federal funding programs. Funds 
are allocated annually based on a formula approved by the North Carolina Board of 
Transportation. The funds must be used for operating expenses, with the exception 
that preventive maintenance and ADA service costs that are defined as capital eligible 
expenses for federal grants are still considered operating expenses for the State 
Maintenance Assistance Program (SMAP) funds. SMAP funds may not be used as 
matching funds for other state programs.105 
 
In 2018, SMAP was budgeted $32,528,557 by the legislature, and disbursed funds 
according to the following formula: 10% equal share, 30% local commitment, 60% 
performance (30% trips/per vehicle hour relative to the statewide average and 30% 
net cost per trip relative to the statewide average106).107 In FY2018, an additional $2M 
was distributed to regional providers based on a connectivity score. For FY 2019, SMAP 
funding was reduced by 26%.108   
Rural Operating Assistance Program (ROAP) 
The Rural Operating Assistance Program (ROAP) is a state-funded public transportation 
program administered by the North Carolina Department of Transportation Public 
Transportation Division (PTD). ROAP funds are distributed to county governments or 
other rural transit system operators and can be used as the local match for federal 
transit grants. ROAP includes three programs:109 
● Elderly & Disabled Transportation Assistance Program (EDTAP) - Provides 
operating assistance for the transportation of the state’s elderly and disabled 
citizens. Originally enacted by legislation in the 1989 Session of the North 
Carolina General Assembly (Article 2B, 136-44.27).  EDTAP can fund up to 100% 
of the cost of service, and is distributed using the following formula: 
○  50% divided equally among all counties; 
○  22 ½ % based on the number of senior residents per county as a 
percentage of the state’s total senior population; 
○  22 ½ % based on the number of disabled residents per county as a 
percentage of the state’s total disabled population; and 
 
105 North Carolina Department of Transportation, Public Transportation Division. (2016). State Maintenance 
Assistance for Urban and Small Urban Program. Retrieved from 
https://www.nctreasurer.com/slg/lfm/audit_acct/single_audit/compliance_supplements/2016%20Compliance%20
Supplements/DOT-9-2016.pdf. 
106 Defined as total expenses minus fares and other operating revenues divided by total trips. 
107 North Carolina Department of Transportation. SMAP Program Guidance Revised. (2018). 
108  North Carolina Department of Transportation. (n.d.). Grants & Annual Reporting Forms. Retrieved from  
https://connect.ncdot.gov/business/Transit/Documents/SMAP%20Application%20and%20disbursement%20FY%2
019.zip. 
109 North Carolina Department of Transportation. (2017, August 9). ROAP Program Guidance Revised.  
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○ 5% based on a population density factor that recognizes the higher 
transportation costs in rural, sparsely populated counties 
 
● Employment Transportation Assistance Program (EMPL) - Program to help 
Department of Social Services clients as part of Workforce Development 
programs, or travel to work for disadvantaged populations.  EMPL can fund up 
to 100% of the cost of service, and is distributed using the following formula: 
○ 10% divided equally among all counties;  
○ 45% based on the population of each county as a percentage of the total 
state population; and  
○ 45% based on the number of unemployed individuals in the labor force 
as a percentage of the number of unemployed individuals in the labor 
force in the state 
 
● Rural General Public Program (RGP) - Provides transportation services to 
individuals who do NOT have a human service agency or organization that will 
pay for the transportation service but live in a county with a transit operator. 
RGP can fund up to 90% of the cost of service, and is distributed using the 
following formula: 
○ 50% divided equally among all eligible counties; and  
○ 50% based upon the rural population of each county as a percentage of 
the total state rural population.  
 
Performance Metrics 
The NCDOT performance report does not discuss transit.110  The Public Transit Division 
has internal performance measurements and goals, but they relate to agency 
performance, asset management, and customer satisfaction, and not to specific transit 
performance measures. They do, however, measure overall ridership increase, but this 
is not linked to a specific goal or tied to funding allocation.111  
 
 
Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania DOT oversees operating and capital investments for transit in 
Pennsylvania, investing over $1.5 billion annually in public transportation in 2017. 
PennDOT oversees 35 fixed route systems,112 44 community transportation systems, 
 
110 North Carolina Department of Transportation. (2018). 2018 Annual Performance Report. Retrieved from 
https://www.ncdot.gov/about-us/our-mission/Documents/2018-annual-report.pdf. 
111 North Carolina Department of Transportation. SUCCESS Plan 2017-2018. Retrieved from 
https://connect.ncdot.gov/business/Transit/Documents/NCDOT%20SUCCESS%20PLAN%2020170807F%20(002).
pdf. 
112 This includes any scheduled bus service. 
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passenger rail service between Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, and 12 intercity bus routes 
provided by two intercity bus companies.113 According to the National Transit 
Database, state funding provided 49.3% ($1,018M) of statewide transit operating 
expenditures in 2017. 
 
Transit Operations Funding 
The passage of Act 44 in 2007,114 established the Public Transportation Trust Fund to 
provide all operating and most capital funding for transit in Pennsylvania. Trust fund 
revenues include: 
● Dedicated 4.4% of state sales tax ($400 million in 2007) 
● $85 - $90 million from the Lottery fund for the Free Transit for Senior Citizens 
Program 
● $125 million in state bond funding for capital projects 
● Annual deposit of $450 million from the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission 
through FY 2021-22. This payment will be reduced to $50 million in subsequent 
years.115,116   
 
 
Table A.2  Transit funding amounts under Act 44117 
 
 
 
 
113 Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. (2019). Public Transit. Retrieved from 
https://www.penndot.gov/Doing-Business/Transit/Pages/default.aspx. 
114 This was subsequently amended by Act 89 in November 2013. Act 44 (P.L. 169) as amended by Act 89 (P.L. 794). 
115 74 P.S. §1506. 
116 Before Act 89, $200 million of the $450 million annual payment from the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission 
was used to fund highway and bridge projects.  
117 PFM Group. (2017). Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission Act 44 Financial Plan Fiscal Year 2018. Pennsylvania 
Turnpike Commission Act 44 Financial Plan Fiscal Year 2018. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission. Retrieved from 
https://www.paturnpike.com/pdfs/business/finance/PTC_Fiscal_2018_Act_44_Financial_Plan.pdf 
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Under Act 44, each transit agency receives base funding, and additional funding 
allocated by formula. State operating funding requires a 15% local match. Base funding 
levels were based on historical funding levels when Act 44 passed in 2007 and are 
increased each year by a multiplier of 1.0506.118  Additional funding is allocated using 
the following formula:  
● Number of passengers - 25% 
● Senior Passenger Premium - 10% 
● Revenue Vehicle Hours - 35% 
● Revenue Vehicle Miles - 30%.119  
 
Performance Measures 
Performance metrics and goals are published in the Pennsylvania Public Transportation 
Annual Performance Report. Transit performance reviews and goal setting are 
conducted on a five-year cycle for each agency.120 Transit operating funding is 
explicitly linked to regular performance reviews (74 PA Code § 1513). Under Sec. 1513(e) 
the DOT may periodically perform reviews and issue reports that: 
● highlights exceptional performance and identifies any problems that need to be 
resolved; 
● assesses performance, efficiency and effectiveness of the use of the financial 
assistance; 
● makes recommendations on follow-up actions required to remedy any 
problem identified; and 
● provides an action plan documenting who should perform the recommended 
actions and a time frame within which they should be performed. 
 
Under 1513(f), the Department uses the following performance criteria: passengers per 
revenue vehicle hour, operating costs per revenue vehicle hour, operating revenue per 
revenue vehicle hour, operating costs per passenger. The Department has the 
discretion to develop additional performance criteria.   
 
Each system's requirements are determined by its past performance and a comparison 
to its peers, both within Pennsylvania and throughout the county. Peers are grouped 
 
11874 P.S. §1513; Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. (2017). Act 44 Transportation Funding. Retrieved from 
https://www.penndot.gov/Doing-
Business/Transit/Funding%20and%20Legislation/Documents/Act44FundPresentation.pdf.  
119Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. (2017). Act 44 Transportation Funding. Retrieved from 
https://www.penndot.gov/Doing-
Business/Transit/Funding%20and%20Legislation/Documents/Act44FundPresentation.pdf.  
120 Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Annual Performance Report, FY2016-17. Available at 
https://www.penndot.gov/Doing-
Business/Transit/InformationandReports/Documents/BPT%20Annual%20Report%202016-17.pdf. 
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based on four criteria: (i) Total revenue hours, (ii) Total revenue miles, (iii) Vehicles in 
maximum service, and (iv) Service area population. Special exceptions are made for 
the state capitol and university towns. Compliance requires that system performance 
metrics are within one standard deviation of peer group mean. If they do not meet 
these goals or follow an action plan to remediate, PennDOT has discretion to withhold 
funding.121  
  
Under Act 44, a “hold harmless” provision ensures that no system shall receive less 
funding than in prior years if it meets its performance requirements. Under Sec. 1513(g), 
if performance decreases compared to a previous review, the department may waive 
any required decrease in funding via formula to bring the system back up to the 
required performance level. If the operator is unable to attain the required 
performance level within two years, they can submit to the DOT an application for a 
waiver containing “an action plan to improve system performance that contains key 
measurable milestones” and submit quarterly progress reports to the Department.  The 
operator will remain eligible for full formula funding throughout the waiver period. If 
the system has not improved by the end of the waiver period, the waiver will be 
withdrawn and the recipient will be responsible for any funding that was given to bring 
the system up to performance level.  
 
 
Tennessee 
The transportation program in Tennessee is funded by state highway user taxes and 
fees. No money from the state’s general fund (funded largely by sales tax revenues) is 
used in any of the programs of the Tennessee Department of Transportation (TDOT).122 
According to the National Transit Database, state funding provided 14.4% ($35.8M) of 
statewide transit operating expenditures in 2017. 
 
State Operating Assistance Program: Provides capital and operating assistance to 
support fixed route and complementary paratransit service in urban core areas of 
Tennessee. Annual program funds are approved by the State Legislature and allocated 
to predetermined public transportation providers by formula. The formula is based on 
population reported in the 2010 Census. Funding for Pigeon Forge and Gatlinburg, 
where ridership is mainly driven by tourists and is significantly higher than other rural 
agencies and operators would not receive sufficient funding from the population-
based formula, is taken off the top, then the remaining funds are allocated based on 
 
121 Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. (2010, December 17). General Overview of Transit Agency 
Performance Review Process. Retrieved from https://www.penndot.gov/Doing-
Business/Transit/InformationandReports/Documents/Act%2044%20Performance%20Reviews/Additional%20Doc
umentation/TPR_Presentation.pdf. 
122 Gas Tax, TN DOT. (n.d.). Retrieved 2019, from https://www.tn.gov/tdot/finance/gas-tax.html  
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UZA population among agencies with fixed route transit. 123 Match requirements for the 
first $500,000 in total expenses are 80% state, 20% local; after first $500,000 in total 
expenses, this changes to 50% state, 50% local.124 
 
Virginia 
State law (SB 1140 Mass Transit) stipulates performance-based funding for mass transit 
with revenues over $160 million. The 2013 law created the Transit Service Delivery 
Advisory Committee to advise the state Department of Rail and Public Transportation 
on specific funding allocations. Although the law describes “performance-based 
funding,” the law delegates the specification of “service delivery factors, based on 
effectiveness and efficiency” to the Commonwealth Transportation Board (CTB), which 
must re-evaluate them every three years and make any changes available for public 
comment one year before they go into effect.  
 
Prior to 2018, operating fund allocations were formula-based, whereby roughly two-
thirds of funds were based on cost amount and the remainder based on “performance 
measures” (actually operating characteristics) that include operating costs, ridership, 
revenue vehicle miles, and revenue vehicle hours.125  HB 1539, passed in 2018, revised 
the methods of allocation to be entirely performance-based beginning in FY 2020, as 
described below. 
 
The Code of Virginia section 33.2-1526.1 Use of the Commonwealth Mass Transit Fund 
determines how funds are allocated and stipulates that local matches are required for 
state funding. The Director of the state Department of Rail and Public Transportation 
must make annual recommendations for allocations within the categories defined and 
shares of state funding defined by the Code as follows: 
● 31% of funds to be allocated to support transit operating costs, distributed “on 
the basis of service delivery factors, based on effectiveness and efficiency…” 
evaluated every three years and announced one year in advance of use 
● 12.5% for capital purposes, excluding the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority (WMATA) 
● 53.5% for the Northern Virginia Transportation Commission for WMATA for 
capital and operating assistance 
 
123 Castrodad, F. G. (2019, April). TN state transit funding [E-mail]. Director of Planning and Grants, WeGo Public 
Transit 
124 UROP Fact Sheet [PDF]. (n.d.). Tennessee DOT. Retrieved 2019, from 
https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/tdot/multimodaltransportation/program-admin-docs-
/UROP_Fact_Sheet_4.1.17.pdf  
125 Commonwealth Transportation Board. (2019). Resolution of the Commonwealth Transportation Board. 
Resolution of the Commonwealth Transportation Board. Retrieved from http://drpt.virginia.gov/media/2733/6.pdf 
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● 3% for special programs including ridesharing, demand management, 
experimental transit, studies, assistance, etc. 
 
The Board may reallocate funds from capital purposes and special programs to transit 
operating funds “in times of statewide economic distress or statewide special need.” In 
addition, the DRPT can reserve a balance of up to five percent of Fund revenues to 
provide year-over-year funding stability. 
 
The state’s new methodology uses performance metrics weighted by system size. 
Performance is also weighed against all state agencies.126 The formula is therefore: 
 
Agency size-weight = (Sum of Agency Sizing Metric / Statewide Totals) * Weight 
 
Bus systems 
● Operating cost (50%) 
● Ridership (30%) 
● Revenue vehicle hours (10%) 
● Revenue vehicle miles (10%) 
Commuter rail systems 
● Passenger miles traveled (33%)  
● Revenue vehicle hours (33%) 
● Revenue vehicle miles (33%) 
 
These metrics are described as being “for the purposes of system sizing,” though sizing 
appears to be explained neither in the policy nor in the Code of Virginia.  
 
 
Wisconsin 
Legislation requires the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (WisDOT) to publish 
annual “cost efficiency standards” to “gauge efficiency over time and identify areas for 
potential improvement.”127   
 
WisDOT uses the following performance indicators to compare the state’s transit 
systems: 
 
126Ibid. 
127 Wisconsin Department of Transportation. (2019). Public Transit System Cost Efficiency Report. Public Transit 
System Cost Efficiency Report. Retrieved from https://wisconsindot.gov/Documents/doing-bus/local-gov/astnce-
pgms/transit/effic-report.pdf 
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● Operating expenses per revenue hour 
● Operating ratio (revenue/expense ratio or “farebox recovery”) 
● Operating expenses per passenger 
● Passengers (unlinked trips) per revenue hour 
● Passengers (unlinked trips) per capita 
● Revenue hours per capita. 
 
The state requires that each aid-receiving transit agency set both long-term (annual 
over 4-year period) and short-term (quarterly) performance goals as well as cost-
efficiency standards, based on the indicators above. Goals must be submitted to 
WisDOT for funding eligibility and WisDOT uses the indicators above to assess each 
aid-receiving transit system annually. In addition, a management performance audit is 
required at least once every five years for all urban mass transit systems. 
 
The state divides the systems into six peer groups:  
● Milwaukee 
● Madison 
● Medium bus systems 
● Small bus systems 
● Commuter bus systems 
● Shared-ride taxi systems. 
 
WisDOT compares the performance of the Milwaukee, Madison, and medium bus 
systems groups with the performance of similarly-sized transit systems nationally, and 
compares the performance of other systems with peers in the state.   
 
To compare agencies, WisDOT sets standards for each performance measure based 
on the peer group average. Systems whose performance on at least four of the six 
minimum performance indicators is within one standard deviation of the average (or 
“better”) are considered to be “in compliance with the standard for the measure.” 
 
When systems do not meet cost efficiency standards, WisDOT undertakes a time-
trend analysis of the 6 performance measures over the most recent five-year period; if 
in that period, the system is in compliance for 4 of the 6 indicators, WisDOT takes no 
further action. If not, WisDOT allows for no further action to be taken if the agency is 
making progress toward the implementation of recommendations made in its most 
recent management performance audit.   
 
If WisDOT determines that an out-of-compliance agency has made insufficient 
progress toward actions previously recommended, the state code directs the agency 
to “provide technical assistance to aid in the implementation of the recommendations.” 
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The transit agency is obligated to pay the nonfederal share of costs for any necessary 
consultant services, however. 
 
Out-of-compliance agencies have three years in which to comply before they face a 
10% revenue penalty, which remains in effect until the agency reaches compliance. 
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Appendix B:  
Survey questions distributed to RTPA and 
transit agency professionals  
 
Introduction
Thank you for participating in this study.  
 
Why you received this survey invitation
The California Transit Association has distributed this survey on behalf of the UCLA Institute of
Transportation Studies, which is doing research to support the Association’s TDA Reform Task
Force effort. As part of that research, the Task Force wishes to query Public Transit Operators on
their experiences with the TDA and Public Transit Operators and Regional Transportation Planning
Agencies about possible changes to the TDA. We value your professional insight and your
completing this survey will greatly contribute to this research and the usefulness of the
recommendations we will make.
What this research is about
We are seeking to understand how current Transportation Development Act (TDA) requirements and
criteria are affecting transit agency decision-making and service outcomes. We are also seeking the
opinions of agency professionals on hypothetical changes to funding eligibility requirements. The
goal of this research is to inform the California State Legislature’s transportation policy
committees, concerning possible changes to the Transportation Development Act.   
How your responses will be used and your privacy assured
None of your individual responses will be presented in any way that identifies you or your
agency without your explicit and written authorization.
Your contact information will never be shared with anyone outside the research team.
Your responses will be stored in the survey software (Research.net) and in UCLA’s G-Suite
Drive, with those services’ commercial data security safeguards in place.
Aggregate survey responses may be reported in publications or presentations in a statistically
summarized fashion (e.g., 68% of respondents answered ‘yes’ to ‘X’.)
What to expect
Depending on your responses, this survey takes an estimated 20-24 minutes to complete for
transit operators and 5-10 minutes for Regional Transportation Planning Agencies.
Questions are single-choice, multiple-choice, and open-ended.
You need not finish the survey in one sitting; you can return to the survey anytime in 14 days.
You can skip any question if you prefer not to answer.
If you have any questions about this research or your participation in it, feel free to contact:
Juan Matute
Deputy Director, UCLA Institute of Transportation Studies
3320 Public Affairs Building
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1656
Telephone: (562) 546-2831
Email: jmatute@ucla.edu
Web: https://www.its.ucla.edu/
Your Rights Regarding Participation and Withdrawal
Your participation in this survey is entirely voluntary, but we value your insights and would
appreciate your contributions to this research.
You may withdraw your participation at any time. You are not waiving any legal rights because of
your participation in this study. If you have any questions about this research, please contact Juan
Matute at jmatute@ucla.edu
1. Do you agree to participate in the study?*
I agree to participate in the study.
I decline to participate in the study
About you
What is your name?
What is your e-mail
address?
2. Your contact information
Name of agency
Title
Years in current role
3. What is your title and how long have you been in your current role?
4. What type of agency do you represent?
If your agency is both a transit operator and an RTPA, please select the type that best matches your
professional role.
*
Transit Operator
Regional Transportation Planning Agency
About your agency
5. What modes does your agency operate (directly and/or by contracting)? 
Please select all that apply.
Fixed-route bus
Light rail
Heavy rail
Commuter rail
Demand response/paratransit
Ferry
Other (please specify)
 Urbanized Non-urbanized
County
population over 500,000
County
population under 500,000
Other (please specify)
6. What describes your agency’s operating area?
Please check all that apply.
PUC 99217: "Urbanized area,” means such an area as defined by Section 101 of Title 23 of the United
States Code:
The term “urbanized area” means an area with a population of 50,000 or more designated by the Bureau of
the Census, within boundaries to be fixed by responsible State and local officials in cooperation with each
other, subject to approval by the Secretary. Such boundaries shall encompass, at a minimum, the entire
urbanized area within a State as designated by the Bureau of the Census.
7. Is your agency a claimant under any of the following articles in the TDA?
Please select all that apply.
Article 4: Public Transportation Operators
Article 4.5: Community Transit Services
Article 8: Other Allocation
I don’t know
8. What farebox recovery ratio requirement (FRR) currently applies to your agency’s TDA funding eligibility,
as defined by PUC § 99268 - 99270.8?
Please select all that apply if different FRRs apply to multiple modes.
Greater than 20%
20%
15%
10%
I don’t know
Other
9. Has your agency been penalized because of a failure to meet TDA eligibility requirements (i.e. the
farebox recovery ratio governed by PUC § 99268 - § 99270.8 or the CPI cost escalation limit, governed by
PUC § 99314.6)?
Please select all that apply.
Yes, penalized by farebox recovery ratio requirement
Yes, penalized by CPI cost escalation  requirement
No
I don't know
Meeting TDA eligibility requirements
10. How has your agency been penalized?
11. Approximately what percentage of your agency's STA funding must be spent for capital purposes as a
result of not meeting efficiency standards as governed by PUC § 99314.6?
Comment (optional):
12. Has your agency been subject to any of the following 3-year penalty terms of compliance?
Please select all that apply.
One-time grace year
Non-compliance year
Determination year
Penalty year for non-compliance year
None of the above
13. Is your agency presently in compliance?
Yes
No
I don't know
14. Do you think your agency will be in non-compliance next year (FY 2019-2020)?
No
I don't know
Yes (please say why):
Your funding environment 
15. In the last five years, has your agency experienced difficulty meeting any of the following funding
requirements? (Check all that apply).
Eligibility to use TDA for operation purposes (TDA must comprise less than 50% of operations funding)
Farebox recovery ratio (“farebox ratio”)
Cost escalation (CPI)
None: no difficulty experienced
 Decreased Stayed about the same Increased
Local funding (e.g. sales
tax for transit)
Labor costs
Non-labor operating
costs
Ridership
Fare revenue
Transit revenue miles
(VRM)
Transit revenue hours
(VRH)
Other
16. Regardless of TDA requirements, over the past five years, what has been the overall trend in the
following at your agency?
    
17. Over the past five years, meeting TDA requirements at my agency has become:
Much more difficult More difficult No change Easier Much easier
18. Why?
 No or N/A Cancelled Decreased/Delayed Increased 
Vehicle Service Hours
(VRH)
Vehicle Revenue Miles
(VRM)
Transit route extensions
New transit routes
Comment (optional):
19. In the last five years, has your agency increased, decreased/delayed or cancelled any of the following
in order to meet TDA eligibility requirements (i.e., farebox recovery ratio, CPI, 50% operating funds limit)?
 Decreased Increased
Labor costs
Non-labor costs (not
affecting transit service)
Labor costs (not
affecting transit service)
Comment
20. In the last five years, has your agency increased or decreased any of the following in order to meet
TDA eligibility requirements (i.e., farebox recovery ratio, CPI, 50% operating funds limit)?
    
21. Has your agency benefited from legislation to modify the farebox recovery ratio or cost escalation
requirements?
Not at all Not really Somewhat Significantly I don't know
TDA requirements
22. Which bill(s) and year(s) benefited your agency?  Please specify the provisions/code sections of the bill
that benefitted your agency.
   
23. To what extent have farebox recovery ratio/cost escalation requirements generated uncertainty in your
agency’s funding?
Not at all Not really Somewhat Significantly
 Definitely not Probably not Unclear Probably Yes, definitely
Help reduce labor costs
in union and contract
negotiations
Help reduce non-labor
vendor costs during
procurement
Lead my agency to
make more cost-
conscious decisions
Motivate local support
for transit (e.g. general
fund, county sales tax)
Motivate my agency to
increase auxiliary
revenues (e.g.
advertising, leasing of
property)
Motivate better route
planning and service
coverage decisions
None
Comment (optional):
24. Do you think the TDA's farebox recovery ratio or CPI cost escalation requirement have any of the
following effects?
 N/A
Significantly
adverse Adverse Minimal or none Positive
Significantly
positive
Farebox recovery
requirement
Cost escalation (CPI)
Operating funds limit (<
50% TDA)
Comment (optional)
25. In your opinion, how significant an effect have the following had on the service your agency provides to
riders?
Discount Pass Programs
26. What type(s) of free or discounted group fare categories does your agency have?
Students (K-12)
Students (post-secondary/college)
Corporate programs (employer-based)
Elderly
Residential area permits
None
Other (please specify)
27. What is the source of funding for the free or discounted group passes funded? (Please check all that
apply.)
Subsidy/payment from student fee
Subsidy/payment from school district or college/university
Subsidy/payment from business or business district
No funding (reduced fare revenues)
Subsidy/payment from other source of funds (please specify):
Comments
28. Has the farebox recovery requirement constrained whether your agency offers free or discounted group
passes?
Yes, we would offer group passes but do not because of the farebox recovery requirement
Yes, we would offer more group passes but do not because of the farebox recovery requirement
No, it has had no effect
I don’t know
Possible Changes to the Transportation Development Act
The UCLA ITS research team is considering various alternatives to the use of farebox recovery ratio
and the CPI Cost escalation requirement to qualify transit operators for state funding. Possible
alternative approaches include augmenting or replacing the performance metrics for required
annual reporting or changing the Triennial Performance Audit process.
29. In your opinion, where should state transit funding be prioritized?
Coverage (less service in
more areas)
Ridership (more service in
fewer areas)
 Strongly Oppose Oppose Neutral Support Strongly support
Passenger miles
traveled (PMT)
Unlinked passenger
trips (UPT)
Fare revenue per
passenger
Passengers per
revenue-vehicle hour
Passengers per
revenue-vehicle mile
Operating cost per
vehicle run
Operating ratio (all
revenue divided by all
costs)
Subsidy per passenger
30. To what extent would you support or oppose the replacement of the Farebox Recovery Ratio and/or the
CPI Cost Escalation requirement with the following performance measures?
31. What frequency of reporting do you think would work best for your agency and for improving transit
performance statewide?
Quarterly
Annually
Biannually
Triennially
Other (please specify)
32. Given a choice between simple and standardized reporting methods (e.g., YOY service hours versus
YOY cost increases) versus comprehensive and holistic reporting methods (e.g., Management practices
currently underway for improving fare revenue), which do you prefer and how strongly?
Strongly prefer
simple/standardized, metric-
driven reporting Indifferent
Strongly prefer
comprehensive/holistic
reporting that takes into
account more qualitative
factors
Your general comments
33. Do you have general comments on the current annual reporting process to the State Controller's Office
(SCO)?
34. Do you have comments on the current triennial audit process?
35. How would you fix the problems (if any) that you think current TDA funding eligibility requirements
present for your agency? What would you change or not change in a revision of the existing law?
36. Do you have any other general comments?
37. May we follow up with you on your responses?
No
Yes, please contact me at the email address entered earlier
Yes, please contact me at a different email address or by phone:
